The automobile industry towards the european integration process : from the “belle époque” to the Maastricht Treaty by Silva, Eduardo Gaspar
Universidade Católica Portuguesa 






The automobile industry towards the European 
integration process – from the “belle époque” to 
the Maastricht Treaty. 
 
 





Orientador: Prof. Doutor Nuno Valério 
Nº de palavras: 34.000 (aprox.) 





Eduardo Gaspar Silva  Universidade Católica Portuguesa 




This Master thesis in European Studies, Economic branch, aims to investigate the 
economic history of the European automobile industry in the context of the European 
integration process, in order to understand the interaction and influences between these 
two subjects. The purpose of the thesis would be to highlight the main problems 
regarding the automobile industry and the European integration process, through a deep 
study of the political, economic and social background from the “belle-époque” period 
to the Maastricht Treaty, in order to create a clear picture regarding the state of the art of 
the European automobile industry in the 1990s.  
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Introduction  
This Master thesis in European Studies, Economic branch, aims to investigate the 
economic history of the European automobile industry in the context of the European 
integration process, in order to understand the interaction and influences between these 
two subjects. The purpose of the thesis would be to highlight the main problems 
regarding the automobile industry and the European integration process, through a deep 
study of the political, economic and social background from the “belle-époque” period1 
to the Maastricht Treaty, in order to create a clear picture regarding the state of the art of 
the European automobile industry in the 1990s. Choosing the “belle-époque” period as 
starting point is justified by the fact that it was in this period that the automobile 
industry gained a significant importance in the social and economic context, and also a 
rising weight in the political field as a mass producer of military machinery2. 
Throughout the 20th century the European automobile industry expanded and increased 
its importance within the European economy, and played progressively an important 
role in the world economy too. Ending the investigation with the Maastricht Treaty can 
be justified by the new paradigm of Europe3 brought by the 1990s political and 
economic changes4 that altered the shape of the world, together with other 
contemporary industrial developments, and opting to investigate them would exceed the 
purpose of the work. Moreover, the consequences of the 1990s episodes haven’t yet the 
necessary historical distance5 to be analyzed in the same conditions as the other periods 
under the research.  
The reason of writing the thesis in English is related with two concerns. The first one is 
that almost all European data, information and economic analysis regarding the 
automobile industry are in English, and translating them could slightly change their 
understanding, leading possibly to erroneous conclusions6. Secondly, I personally 
believe that the thesis would add more value to my future overseas if written in English, 
and possibly serving as a credible study allowing other European students to continue 
the investigation.  
                                                           
1
 According to the definition of “Belle-époque” of Valério, Nuno e Bela Nunes, Ana (2004) 
2 Rosseau, Jaques (1958) 
3 Blaha, Jaroslav (2005) 
4 The main events were: in 1989 the end of the Cold War; in 1990 the union of the two Germanys and the 
free flow of capitals within the European Community; in 1991 the dissolution of the URSS and the end of 
the Warsaw Treaty; and in 1993 the European Union with the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty. 
5 Following the concept of “historical distance” supported by Pimentel, Antonio Filipe (1992) . 
6 Goldenberg, Phyllis (2004)  
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Chapter I – Subject, Methodology and Definitions 
 
1. Subject - The Automobile Industry in Europe 
In global terms and within the European region, the automobile industry can be seen as 
an oligopoly7. The ten largest automobile companies account for almost 80% of the 
world cars production. In the major markets of North America, Japan and Europe 
demand has matured and the industry has become a high cost/low margin business. The 
sector suffered from significant over-capacity even though the barriers to market entry 
in the sector were high. This was due to the international growth strategy of producers 
from developing regions and the efforts made by the producers in established regions to 
improve their productive efficiency. This environment has led to an extensive range of 
joint-ventures and take-overs between the leading automobile companies, as they were 
seeking to balance large-scale production with product diversity. These market 
conditions have created testing times for many automobile companies in the 1990s and 
complex problems for policy-makers. 
The industry remains of fundamental economic importance to national and regional 
economies. The economic significance of the automobile industry relies on the fact that 
it is such a large and multifarious sector. A variety of sub-groups can be found within 
the automobile sector, such as full-line vehicle assemblers, large-scale components 
producers, sub-assemblers, multi-product companies, direct suppliers, equipment 
suppliers to assemblers, large suppliers of materials, intermediate items specialists, 
retailers, car dealers, repair shops, and so on. The focus of this thesis will be on major 
automobile assemblers, because of their pivotal position within the automobile industry 
and also because they provide the end market for many other sectors.  
Throughout its history, the automobile sector reached an immense importance in 
Europe. Thus, nowadays the interests of the industry and its product are heavily 
regulated and the policy process extends well beyond manufacturing. Areas such as 
transport infrastructure, transport regulation, safety and environment are some of the 
examples of the policy-relevant aspects of the automobile industry interests for national 
and international policies. As Harden stated, the principles of the European Union 
constitution involved a transformation of the relationship between the public sector and 
                                                           
7 McLaughlin, A. and Maloney, W. (1999)  
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the economy that has typified the twentieth century state8.  Accordingly, this thesis aims 
to analyze European-industry relations (in the automobile sector) firstly through the 
history of the automobile industry in Europe, and secondly through the European 
history in the automobile industry. This approach is in line with the ordo-liberalist point 
of view, where as the economic environment constrains political decisions, so should 
the political environment constrain economic decisions9. 
The automobile industry is a good example of an industrial sector in which national 
policy instruments have been slowly replaced by regional political and economic 
integration. It will be examined how policy-makers have managed their relations with 
the industry, and how the industry organized itself to participate in the policy-making 
process. By examining historical events at national levels, and then at the regional level 
in Europe, the thesis aims to identify the structures that have evolved and the 
relationship between these structures and the policy outcomes. The point is not to 
explain deeply the system’s political development in Europe, but to analyze its ability to 
arrive at collective decisions in specific cases such as the automobile industry10. 
Accounting for policy outcomes requires an analysis of the relationship between public 
authorities and the industry. To this goal, the recent literature on European Union (EU) 
policy-making has focused on developing and refining theoretical tools and models 
which can cope with the multi-level governance of EU.  
2. The historical study 
To describe the relationship between the political (European institutions) and the 
economic (automobile sector) in Europe, the historical dimension is of upmost 
importance in order to understand its economic problems and the political solutions to 
those problems11. Thus, to analyze the European integration impact in the automobile 
sector, first it is necessary to understand the automobile history until the beginning of 
the European Union. To do so, the historical study was based in two complementary 
approaches: the classical and the sectoral approach. It remains an open question whether 
                                                           
8 Harden (1994) p610. 
9 Gerber (1988) p44.; Although we are still far away from a closed definition of European economic 
environment as stated Poiares Maduro, Miguel (1997), p65. 
10 Dominik, Lasok et al. (1981), p562. 
11 Lopes, Ernâni R. (1981), p7. 
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governmental industry relationships may vary more significantly or consistently 
between sectors than between nations12. 
 
2.1 The historical study - the Classical approach 
The classical approach seeks to identify durable national policy-making traditions 
amongst political elites13 which are then reflected in policies developed within national 
political systems. The essence of the classical approach is that politics determines 
policy
14. Accordingly the macro-political influences are important in shaping specific 
industry policies.  
This study aims to explore the historical evolution of domestic political structures, and 
to understand their impact on economic and industrial policy. Thus, the classical 
approach is a way to understand national political systems when interfering in the 
development of industrial policies and the government-industry relations. One of the 
main assumptions is that industrial governance structures are in large part the product of 
domestic political acts and outcomes.  
 
2.2 The historical study - the Sectoral approach 
In the sectoral approach, the concept is that policy determines policies and suggests 
complementarities in the research towards identifying recurring policy problems and 
challenges faced by policy participants, which cluster around particular policy sectors. 
Within these arenas, state actors and groups form interdependent relations and attempt 
to influence and segment the policy agenda. Thus, the political system cannot be widely 
characterized, but instead, it breaks down into a series of sub-systems in which may be 
possible to identify a diversity of policy-making styles and traditions15. 
The sectoral approach also assumes that over time, each sector or industry will evolve a 
group of governing structures which will mould and shape the politics of the 
                                                           
12 Wilks, S. and Wright, M. (1987), p290. 
13 According to the definition of “Political Elites” in Lopes, Ernâni (2009), p21. 
14 Freeman, G. P. (1985), pp 467-496 
15 The complexity in characterizing the political system in many European countries can be seen in 
Cawson, A. (1986), pp56-60. 
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sector16.Thus, in terms of on what shapes the industrial policy, the sectoral approach 
starts from differentiation within individual countries across sectors and convergence 
across nations within sectors and companies17. 
3. Policy networks18 
The different political discourses used to legitimate industrial policy are an important 
feature of the European economy. Many authors19 have shown how states have pursued 
different policy paths for key industrial sectors. The cross-national differences in 
discourse, style, and instruments have provided a complex heritage for European 
Commission as it asserts its authority in the automobile sector. The Commission’s 
response, at least in terms of policy outcomes, has vacillated between an ascendant neo-
liberal approach, and the traditional social market position of the central European 
states20. 
When studying the European history in the automobile industry, it is necessary to take 
into account that in the 1960s the automobile production was getting more and more 
global and both classical and sectoral approach must adapt to a new paradigm in the 
policy-making in Europe. 
Policy network can be defined as the clusters of actors forming around specific policy 
areas and programs within the political system, and also the various interactions 
between actors within a policy sector. Nevertheless, the policy network definition has 
also its problems because the key concepts have different meanings in different authors. 
They are currently divided over the importance of interpersonal relationships and 
whether networks exist at the sectoral or sub-sectoral or even at the micro level. These 
debates are far away from the goals of this thesis, so the issue will be left intact, and the 
level of policy network analyzed will be only at the European-level. 
 
 
                                                           
16 Campbell, J. et al (1991), p103. 
17 Freeman, G. P. (1985), p486 
18 The concept “policy network” indeed has many similarities to the concept of “Centros/Teias de Poder” 
explained by Rodrigues, Eduardo L. (2008), p118. 
19 As shown in Shonfield, A. (1965). 
20 Wilks, S. (1998). 
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3.1 Policy networks at the EU-level 
The propensity for conflict during issue resolution in a multi-level structure like the EU 
is high and it leads to a vigorous debate (or antagonistic cooperation21). The EU 
institutional mechanism to solve differences of interests between actors results in a wide 
network, also called “political network” 22 because of the political actors involved in the 
process. 
Policy outcomes may have to do with the interaction between networks and other 
governance structures, as they have interactions between actors within a network. In this 
case policy-making very often cannot be contained in a single community23 especially 
when legislation involves sub-systems, approvals from larger political system, and so 
on. This creates competition, conflict and new policy players.  In a fragmented and 
multi-level decision-making system as the EU, policy networks try to legitimate their 
own decisions in national networks.  
Several policy studies have identified policy networks at the European level (even if in 
many cases the nomenclature has not been adopted24). This is because there are inherent 
features in the EU polity which encourage policy networks. Firstly, the policy-making 
structures of the EU were designed to depoliticize issues and break them down into 
components that could be managed away from the domestic political intervention. 
Secondly, the institution responsible for proposing legislation25, the European 
Commission, was designed to manage the interaction process through a process of 
delegation and monitoring. Third, the Commission lacks the resources and expertise to 
manage the policy process from the centre26. We can find that in the implementation 
stages of policy-making, where the Commission has little choice but to rely on policy 
participants attracted or invited to the discussion. Some obstacles that emerge in this 
process are due to the high level of inter-relationship between the actors. Sometimes the 
main question is to know in which stage should be negotiated the issues and even more 
                                                           
21
 Marin, B. and Mayntz, R. (1991), p17. 
22 Idem. 
23 Ripley, R and Franklin, G (1984). 
24 The complete list of studies is described in McLaughlin, A. and Maloney, W. (1999), pp108-112. 
25 In the analyzed period of this thesis. 
26 Ribeiro, Sónia (2008), p24. 
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important, in which stages should be negotiated those issues in order to achieve more 
quickly the desired goals/outcomes27. 
Because of the diffuse nature of the EU political system it is difficult to identify the 
boundaries of EU-level policy networks. This also happens when analyzing the 
Commission’s activities, which like most of EU institutions, is not a monolith. The EU 
is a complex and unique policy-making system. Its multi-national and neo-federal 
nature, the extreme openness of decision-making to lobbyists and the considerable 
weight of national politico-administrative elites28 within the process, create an 
unpredictable and multi-level policy-making environment29.  
 
4. Definitions and limitations of the thesis 
The methodological orientation to be followed, the path of the investigation that 
progressively is opened, the nature of the problems that surround the study and the 
possible outcomes of the thesis, do not seem compatible with the strict definition of 
“Economic Science”. In order to precise and situate this thesis’s domains, the author 
believes that it is a study of “Economic Policy” or even more exact as one of “European 
Economic Policy”30. 
Regarding the methodological approach, the classical and sectoral approach in a 
historical study has been constantly refined since the 1970s, and there is a danger that 
when attempting to offer too precise definitions, the main concept is lost and with it 
much of the thesis’ objectives. Rigid definitions can obstruct the fluidity of this thesis, 
especially because the industry has become much more complicated in Europe than it 
was decades ago. Therefore, this study aims to follow the tradition of authors like Sir 
Karl Popper, Isaiah Berlin31 and Henri Poincaré, regarding the belief of the permanent 
interaction between the thought and the action, as being the great criteria to characterize 
the true scientific knowledge32. 
                                                           
27 Thorstensen, Vera and Jank, Marcus (2005), p23. 
28 As an European version of “Political Elites”, according to Lopes, Ernâni R. (2009), p21.. 
29 Richardson, John (1996), pp3-4. 
30 The concepts of “Economic Science”, “Economic Policy” and “European Economic Policy” are well 
defined in Lopes, Ernâni R. (1981) pp9-12. 
31 We can find an accurate description of these authors in Espada, João Carlos (2008). 
32 Rodrigues, Eduardo L. (2008), p53. 
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A considerable amount of policy-making in the automobile sector is also highly 
technical. Sometimes some technical questions are explored not only because of its 
intrinsic importance but also because it is necessary to better understand the decisions in 
this sector. Although some technical debates will be explored, the objective of this 
thesis is not to enter deeply in the technical issues, and the focus should be on the 
economic questions. The thesis aims to analyze the policy networks and observe how 
actors from different territorial levels come together to resolve the economic issues. 
There are issues of significant importance to the single market in vehicles, but 
sometimes they are matters of “high-politics”, which are decided at a level well beyond 
the politics of the automobile sector. The focus will be on those areas where the 
Commission-industry negotiations made a difference in Europe. 
Aware of the limitations of this kind of study at a European-level, Peterson argued that 
we still have few definitive answers to the truly important questions, regarding any 
research which seeks to answer fundamental questions about the nature of the EU as 
system of government 33.  
  
                                                           
33 Peterson, J. (1995), p89. 
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Chapter II – Automobile Industry developments in Europe 
 
1. From the steam to the gasoline vehicle 
Many Europeans experimented using illuminating gas and petroleum as fuels for 
mechanical transport through internal combustions in the 1860s and latter. The first 
successes of major consequence came in southwestern Germany. In Manheim in 1886, 
Carl Benz, attached a four-stroke gasoline engine of his own design to a large tricycle 
and drove it successfully34.  
Although Carl Benz is often stated as the “father” of the motorcar, Gottlieb Daimler 
made similar progress during this period. Daimler worked with Nicholas Otto at the 
Deutz company, but struck out on his own in 1882. Together with Wilhem Maybach 
they settled the Daimler Motor Company in Stuttgard, but they were targeting engines 
for boats, tramways and stationary purposes. At first he continued to make small 
number of powered tricycles, selling most of them in Paris. Benz finally introduced a 
four-wheel car in 1882 and sales began to rise. From 1888 to 1893 Benz sold 69 
vehicles, and just by introducing the four-wheel model the sales were about 67 in 1894 
and 135 in 1895.35 Automobiles had become a serious business 36.  
By 1898 the Benz Company had sold a total of 1132 cars, most of them to the French 
aristocracy. In fact, there was a strong French interest in automobiles and slowly the 
country began its way to be the center of the early automobile industry. The connection 
began in 1887 when Daimler’s company licensed the firm Panhard&Levassor (P&L) to 
manufacture its engines37. In the following years, Daimler and Emile Levassor 
persuaded the family of Armand Peugeot to use some of the French-made engines. With 
the business rising, Peugeot also started to sell automobiles of its own design, powered 
by the P&L engines38. 
Closely related to the early growth of the European automobile industry was the 
bicycle. Developed first in France in the 1860s, British firms soon dominated this trade. 
                                                           
34 Ickx, Jacques (1961) , pp. 152-156 
35 Hanf, Reinhard (1980) pp 18-46 
36 Stratton, Michael (1994);  pp 281-288 
37 Siebertz, Paul (1950), pp 170-172. 
38 Corlin, Georges (1965), p49 
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The market for the earliest bicycles, with their very high front wheel, remained limited 
to athletic young men until the introduction of the safety bicycle in the mid-1880s. This 
type had wheels of equal size and a chain drive, and now almost everyone could ride it. 
After the appearance of a second major innovation, pneumatic tires in the early 1890s, 
bicycles became the fashion for middle and upper class young men and women. As 
more and more producers entered this business, prices dropped, the market expanded 
and a bicycle boom ensued in Europe and North America in 1895-97.  
According to several authors39, in a variety of ways bicycles led directly to automobiles. 
Many technical aspects carried over into car design and manufacture: ball bearings, 
chain drive, pneumatic tires, and the manufacture of standardized parts by single-
purpose cutting tools or stamping presses. Bicycles also accustomed people to 
individual mechanical transport and encouraged tinkerers to apply some sort of 
mechanical power to them. Methods to publicize and market bicycles were also adopted 
by automakers: annual shows that featured new models, races between cities or on 
tracks, specialized weekly and monthly publications financed by manufacturers’ 
advertising, and a system of dealers and repair shops. 
  
2. Through the “Belle-Époque”  
The period from 1870 to 1914 was notable not only for the rapid growth of industry in 
Europe, but also for the concentration and combination movement. This was the period 
of the rise of new industries, such as automobile, chemical and electrical, and the rapid 
rise of the German industry40.  
Both automobile production and market grew quite rapidly from 1898 on.41 After the 
turn of the century, motorcar manufacturing in Britain began to expand, followed a few 
years later in Germany and Italy.  
 
 
                                                           
39 It is possible to find this theory in the following authors: Barker, Theo (1987), p8; Church, Roy (1982) 
p 12-19; Friedson, Paul (1972), p.560; Hanf, Reinhard (1980) p46; Homurg, Heidrum (1978) pp 180-193; 
Laux, James M. (1976) pp 210-213;  
40
 Friedlander, Heinrich and Oser, Jacob (1953), p221 
41  Laux, James M. (1976) pp 210-213 
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Chart 1: World Automobile Production 1900 – 1914 
 
Years France Britain Germany Italy Europe U.S. 
1900 4,800         4,192 
1903 14,100 2,000 1,450 225,000 17,775 11,325 
1908 25,000 10,500 5,547 2,300 43,347 65,000 
1910 38,000 14,000 13,113 4,000 69,113 187,000 
1913 45,000 34,000 20,388 6,760 106,148 485,000 
1914       9,210   569,000 
 
Sources: 
(Italic numbers are estimates) 
France: Laux, James M. (1976), pp 210-213 
Britain: Nicholson, Theo (1982) pp 379. 
Germany: Von Scherr-Thoss, H. C. (1974). 50-63 
Italy: Bottiglieri, Bruno (1987), pp 40-45 
U.S.: National Automobile Chamber of Commerce (1933), pp 16-22. 
 
2.1 The Automobile in France 
In 1895 the industry’s promoters staged a real automobile race, a run nonstop from 
Versailles to Bordeaux and back. This event had a quite impressive publicity in the 
following newspapers, which ratified the French and German lead in automobiles.  
The Paris-Bordeaux race saw also the introduction of a major improvement for 
automobiles – the pneumatic tire. Though, the pneumatic tire reinvented in Belfast, 
Ireland, by John Boyd Dunlop in 1888 was used only in the bicycles, until 1902 when 
was adapted into some automobiles.42 The rise of the automobile sales certainly 
accustomed many French people to powered individual transport and prepared the 
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market for full-sized motor cars. Actually not just French people, but also British, 
German, Italian and American people, started to increase the demand for a self powered 
vehicle.  
The earliest buyers of cars in Europe were wealthy sportsmen, interested in novelty and 
speed, and engineers intrigued by the new mechanical devices. Soon, clients from other 
social groups joined them, including businessman, physicians, prosperous rural 
landowners and traveling salesman. Then, in the few years before the First World War 
when a great number of inexpensive cars became available, some independent 
craftsmen began to come into the market.43 
Cars were sold and repaired at the factories in the early days, but soon the manufactures 
contracted with agents or dealers to represent them. The automakers established their 
own branches in major cities to ensure reliable treatment of customers, creating a wide 
and mass post-sales service.  
Louis Renault entered the trade in Paris late 1898, converting some existing vehicles 
into most powerful machines by developing their engineering. He used the Daimler 
engines in his vehicles. Another Paris firm, Mors, almost collapsed in 1907 due to 
unstable management, and André Citroën was brought in to save it.  
The European industry concentrated on gasoline engines, rather than electricity or 
steam.44 Nevertheless, in New York some businessman reasoned that the simplicity, 
silence, smoothness and reliability of electric cars made them suitable for cab service.  
Of the French automakers, only one, Lorraine-Dietrich came from the manufacture of 
the heavy equipment45. Ultimately, several firms from that sector did enter the new 
industry, such as the boiler maker Delaunay-Bellevile, which made heavy and elegant 
cars and the armaments firm Schneider.  The large engineering companies in Europe did 
not go well in auto manufacturing. The design, production and selling of complex 
consumer goods like passenger cars was quite different from locomotives, heavy 
electrical equipments or shipbuilding. The characteristic of operations was so unlike 
what these firms had been doing that few choose to enter the new business. 
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In what concerns the investment, in general the accumulation of investment capital was 
not a major problem for early automakers, for they did not require large amounts. Firms 
already in metalworking, gradually shifted resources to the new automobile production 
lines46. The founders of new companies like Renault, Delage or others, obtained easily 
capital from family or friends. All that they needed could be resumed to leasing a small 
workshop, installing a few used machine tools and buying some components on credit.  
The one third down payments usually required of customers when they ordered a car 
provided additional working capital and banks were willing to make short term 
advances on the basis of firm orders for cars47. Further growth could come from 
retained earnings, but a faster way was to convert the company to a corporation and sell 
shares. Banks or investment houses, often small ones, assisted in these public offerings. 
An interesting pattern in the European automobile industry in this period was the 
refinancing of the firms on the London market, which reached a peak in the years 1903-
1906.  
When European automobile production expanded, it appeared into the business a variety 
of component manufacturers. Suppliers of axles, wheels, radiators, and other parts, own 
they rise to the automobile trade. But more important was the auto industry’s demand 
for special steels, originally developed in the 1860’s for naval armament.  
In terms of foreign trade, although France remained the leading European automobile 
producer before 1914, Great Britain provided by far the largest European market for the 
new machines. The early French intercity races attracted great attention in Britain and 
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1907 1913 1907 1913 
France 27.9 43.9 1.7 3.8 
Britain 6.5 21.1 20.1 31.7 
Germany 3.4 20.7 4.3 3.4 
Italy 3.9 7.5 1.6 2.2 
U.S. 5.5 32.8 4.8 2 
 
Source: White , Harry D. (1983), pp. 44-45 
 
The rapid rise of American auto exports (chart 2) reflects the success of the Ford and 
other low and medium-priced car in world markets after 1910. France’s head start 
allowed it to maintain the lead in exports until the war, but it began to lose its power in 
the three or four years before the First World War.   
The same standardization occurred in Europe. As European auto makers began to pay 
more attention to the low and medium price range, they sold more cars with standard 
bodies to reduce the total price to customers49. They made these bodies in their own 
shops, or bought body-making companies, or contracted with independent body firms to 
supply several standard designs.  
 
2.2 The Automobile in Great Britain 
There were about two dozen motor vehicles for passengers in Great Britain by the end 
of 1895, half of them imported from France and Germany, and the rest put together by 
individual experimenters50. But only one (Herbert Austin) was associated in a 
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managerial position with a metalworking firm. In Germany and especially France, 
production of automobiles came first, and then the market, in Britain the case was the 
opposite51. Several reasons may be advanced as why British manufactures hesitated to 
enter the new business. From the early 1890s to late 1897 the bicycle trade enjoyed a 
marvelous boom – there was no need for these firms to diversify into another line. 
Second, various laws known as Red Flag legislations limited speeds of mechanical road 
vehicles52. 
As British interest in motorcars began to grow in 1895 and 1896 following reports of 
races in France and the appearance of a few automobiles at London and other cities, the 
Red Flag legislation was soon revised. Some bicycle firms in London were cautious 
about shifting into the new industry, but with the serious depression sustained by the 
bicycle trade, a great number of firms moved to the motor business. A second center of 
automobile production was Glasgow, the heart of metalworking in Scotland. There, 
firms like Arrol-Johsnton, Albion or Argyll began importing Renault and De Dion-
Bouton cars, then imported their parts and assembled them.  
Gradually they increased the share of locally made parts and began to make their own 
models. Although London was by far the largest market for automobiles in Britain, it 
had not become more than a secondary center for their manufacture. Automobile firms 
began to operate successfully in a variety of cities, a pattern of dispersal quite unlike the 
French centralization in Paris, but similar to the German experience. 53 After the 
recession of 1908, British auto production expanded more rapidly and several 
companies began to turn out over a thousand cars per year. As this occurred, Parliament 
in 1909 approved a tax on motorcars, after France (1898), Italy (1906) and Germany 
(1906). As in other countries, the tax was based on fiscal horsepower54.  
With the Ford’s models and the inexpensive cars offered by other British firms, the 
British automobile market began in 1912 to shift toward the low-price range55. The 
British took those vehicles more quickly and probably made more of them before 
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191456. One reason for this may have been their familiarity with steam-powered road 
haulers. In addition, Britain had a smaller mileage of competing rural railways than did 
France or Germany. After the speed limit went up in 1896, lighter and faster steam 
wagons, buses and traction engines came into service57. At first, foreign manufactures 
supplied many of these vehicles: De Dion-Bouton from France and from Germany 
Daimler and Büssing. The Clarkson Company introduced gasoline buses to London in 
1904, and the number rose so quickly that the London Omnibus was created. By making 
one standard model, it became the largest bus builder in Britain, and during the First 
World War produced a large share of the British trucks58. 
Britain continued to import large numbers of cars and parts through 1923. The French 
share of these imports, although remaining the largest, declined before the onslaught of 
cheaper cars from the United States from 1910 on. Britain’s free trade policy explains in 
part its large number of automotive imports. Regarding this issue, Foreman-Peck 
highlighted that a high trade tariff would have encouraged the growth of the British 
automobile industry before 191459. Other European producers had modest duties on 
automotive imports, 3% of value for Germany, 5% for Italy, 10% for France and 12% 
for Belgium. Exports from Britain climbed steeply starting in 1910, with Australia – the 
leading market – followed by New Zealand, India, South Africa, Argentina and even 
Russia. By 1914 heavy imports and growing home production had made Britain the 
most motorized of major European countries. The number of registered motorcars and 
trucks in that year was 210,000; compared with 125,000 in France; 70,515 in Germany 
and 23,900 in Italy60. 
2.3 The Automobile in Germany 
In Germany a wide variety of firms began experimenting with automobile production 
from 1898 on. One reason was the obvious success of Benz, and also with the bicycle 
market falling down, many of the bicycle makers considered a new line of product, 
either motorizing their machines or moving to full-sized cars. Publicity about French 
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achievements with automobiles reinforced these considerations. It is no surprise that 
many entrants to the new industry came from firms producing bicycles and sewing 
machines61. More than in France or in Britain, many carriage and wagon builders also 
experimented with automobiles, as did general machine shops. Because the 
metalworking industry was widely spread in Germany, early auto producers appeared 
all over the country. Although most of them left the auto business within a few years, 
enough remained to result in a much dispersed geographic pattern as the industry 
matured62. This dispersal probably had the effect of slowing the growth of the German 
car industry.  The lack of centralization tended to delay the appearance of component 
manufacturers, for they were not able to supply several auto firms in the same locality 
and so take advantage of long production runs and the consequent economics of scale.  
The rarity of component makers in turn made it harder in the very early days for the 
single entrepreneur to assemble cars on a financial shoestring, so frequent in France and 
in Britain63. In addition, craft traditions in Germany retained more power that to the 
west, and it was judged positive for an auto firm to have as many parts as possible made 
by skilled craftsmen in its own shops.  
Chart 3: Motor vehicles produced by some German firms 1899 – 1914 
Year Benz Daimler Opel 
1899 572 108 11 
1903 172 232 178 
1908 646 231 500 
1914 3,164 1,972 3,519 
 
Source: 
Benz and Daimler: Oswald, W. (1986), pp. 16-17. 
Opel: Ludvigsen, K. (1975) p96. 
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As we can see in the chart, in the first years of the twentieth century, none of the 
German firms played as significant role as Benz and Daimler. Expanding steadily along 
with the German auto industry as a whole, Benz in 1907 bought a small producer in 
Gaggenay to build low-priced models, and the car became Benz’s sales leader in the 
prewar years64. 
Early in 1901 Maybach and Paul Daimler began delivering a new model named 
Mercedes and it performed very well in some races and established a high standard for 
luxury cars. For the first time in Europe a car that was not French set the style for 
automobile design. The Daimler Company, with a winner model on his hands began to 
expand. Production climbed from 96 units in 1900 to 863 in 1905 and process rose also. 
For this, Daimler’s Mercedes cars, as well as its trucks and buses did not sell well in 
Germany. Of 2,685 vehicles produced from 1902 through 1907, almost 80% were 
exported. Daimler concentrated its production methods65, so its output did not grow 
rapidly after 1904 and its market share declined as other companies entered the 
business.  
The German government introduced more regulations on cars and driving that did the 
Western countries and in 1906 began to collect a tax based on fiscal horsepower. It 
ranged from 1% to 3% of the original cost of a car, and so provided a modest incentive 
to buyers of small cars66. As in France and Britain, small cars began to take a larger 
share of the growing German market after 1910. The trend to smaller cars in Germany 
paralleled that in the Western countries.  
Like France and Britain, Germany produced only a few gasoline trucks in the early 
years of the twentieth century. There was a slightly larger market for buses, especially 
in England where Daimler and Büssing sold some around 190567. In Germany, 
however, the bus business never developed as in the Western countries. Truck use 
began to grow more rapidly in 1907, and from the seven years in that date until 1914 the 
number of trucks registered rose from 957 to 9,63968. A small share of this growth came 
from the military subsidy system that went into effect in 1908. Nevertheless, German 
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truck making was quite a small factor in 1914, less than Britain or France, a situation 
that would leave consequences during the war that began that year.  
As in Britain, the German auto industry as a whole grew rapidly from 1909, and began 
to take a larger share of the international market. By 1913 Russia had become the 
leading buyer of German automotive products, followed by Austria-Hungary, Great 
Britain and Argentina. The Germans too were moving into the less developed countries.  
2.4 The Automobile in Italy 
Automobile production and sales in Italy trailed well behind the three more highly 
industrialized countries69. Around 1900 most of the cars sold were French chassis with 
locally manufactured bodies. A handful of firms began to make the chassis themselves, 
and by 1905 Italy produced more cars that it imported70. The domestic market was 
small, as average income was low, so most Italian automakers at first aimed primarily at 
the export market with large luxury and sports models.  
The northern cities of Milan and Turin quickly became the centers of the industry. Each 
had a foundation of small machine shops, railway equipment builders and carriage 
makers, along with skilled metalworkers71. As it was the most economically developed 
part of the country, northern Italy also was the center of the domestic market for cars. 
Firms like Bianchi, Isotta Fraschini and Lanza began making cars around 1895. 
 
In July 1899 was established the Fabbrica Italiana di Automobili di Torino, or FIAT. 
Production was the first priority, adopting the best foreign practices, by buying parts 
from France and offering cars based on Mercedes lines72. In 1903 the Fiat’s outputs 
reached 135 cars and over the next three years the company enjoyed a boom and had to 
enlarge its plants several times. Fiat followed policies of vertical integration and product 
diversification. It took control or influence over steelworks, foundries, machine-tool 
producers, woodworking, body shops, sales agencies and even some public 
transportation companies. It also began to make commercial vehicles in 1903, aircraft 
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engines in 1908 and marine engines in 1909. The growth of the automobile industry in 
France and Fiat’s success inspired other Italian entrepreneurs.  
In Milan, Isotta Fraschini began making its own large models in 1902 and soon entered 
races to build a reputation. Piacenza, Brescia, Florence and Genoa also housed small 
producers in these years. 73The Pirelli rubber company of Milan also took part in the 
new industry. It began manufacturing auto tires in 1899 and was the first Italian 
manufacturing firm to establish a foreign branch – in Spain in 1902. Pirelli dominated 
the tire business in Italy as did Michelin in France, Dunlop in Britain and Continental in 
Germany.  
Chart 4: Automobiles produced by some Italian firms 1901-1914 
Year Fiat Alfa Isotta 
1901 135     
1905 461     
1910 1,78 20 125 
1914 4,644 272 308 
 
Sources: 
Fiat and Alfa: Bottiglieri, Bruno (1987), pp 40-45 
Isotta Fraschini: Anselmi, Angelo T. (1977), pp 252-358 
 
Although the number of motorcars registered in Italy in 1905 barely exceeded 2000, the 
government established an annual tax on them. It varied according to the engine’s 
horsepower, as elsewhere in Europe74.  
Fiat began to sell medium-priced cars and did well with them, and like other European 
countries was moving toward smaller cars. It also began making trucks and buses in 
1903. The output rose slowly to 82 vehicles in 1910 but then reached 624 in 1912, and 
1408 in 1914. These numbers show Fiat to be not only Europe’s largest truck maker but 
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the only one with a considerable output in Italy. The Italian army’s interests in trucks 
lay behind Fiat’s growth in this area. The army’s 1912 maneuvers and then the outbreak 
of the Italo-Turkish War in that year brought Fiat some large orders for trucks. The war 
with Turkey was fought in Libya, where Fiat trucks were the only mean of transport. 
Fiat also received some prewar military truck orders from the Russian government75. 
Italy remained the smallest of the four leading automobile producing countries of 
Europe by 1914, and without Fiat, Italy’s production would have been negligible.  
 
2.5 Other European Countries 
Automobiles were produced in many of the other countries of Europe, in cities with 
metalworking traditions such as Barcelona, Geneva, Zurich, Vienna, Prague, Budapest, 
Amsterdam and Copenhagen76. Russia, despite its wretched roads, became a sizable 
market for trucks and heavy cars, but manufacturing hardly began before the war. In 
1904 about 10,000 motor vehicles of all types operated in the country and the Russo-
Baltic Company, had assembled some 450 vehicles over several years from components 
from Germany and Belgium77. Automobile manufacturing had become an important 
industry in Western and Central Europe, employing directly more than 100,000 
workers. Europeans had invented the gasoline car and demonstrated great technical 
prowess in its development. However, they had not really developed a mass market for 
it. To do this the producers had to learn how to make cars more cheaply, something the 
Americans were pioneering in the years just before the First World War.78 
 
2.6 Manufacturing and Production 
Workers, at least in localities with other metalworking shops, were not hard to find. 
European auto firms did not expand their output so rapidly as to require huge increases 
in their work forces79. They drew the skilled people they needed from bicycle or 
machine building firms, and they had no difficulty attracting teenagers as unskilled 
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helpers. When companies began to produce more than a handful of cars per week and 
price competition became a factor, management began to seek production methods
would simplify and speed output and reduce costs
American automobile factories adopted the flow production arrangement early and it 
began to appear in European plants after the 1907
automakers to reduce costs and broaden their market by making low
Ford’s success with flow production in his new factory in Michigan, brought many 
visitors from Europe and many more read about it. Another American, Frederik W. 
Taylor, also began to influence European motorcar production during
“Taylorism” aimed to increase labor productivity through preparation, measurement, 
and inspection of work in automobile factories. The Taylor system examined each task 
performed by a man or a machine and tried to increase the output
Hounsell81  and Barker82 the “Ford
task itself by mechanization, thereby reducing the labor input sharply, especially skilled 
labor.  
Chart 5 - Estimated average daily wage of Autoworkers (dollars per day)
 
Source: Laux, James, et Al 
 
Working conditions in European auto factories tended to be slightly better than in other 
metalworking establishments
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and one-half or six days a week. In the dozen years up to 1914, weekly hours tended to 
decline and wages to rise84. 
 
3. First World War 
The head of the German Daimler company commented that “The war was a huge 
glutton whose favorite dish was motor vehicles“85. Actually, when it became clear that 
the conflict would last more than a few months, armies began ordering great amounts of 
conventional munitions (machine guns, artillery shells, and other weaponry) from 
automobile firms. Then, as motor vehicles proved their value in moving supplies, troops 
and artillery, the orders for trucks, buses and tractors mounted. When the military in 
1915-16 recognized how the airplane had become a valuable weapon86, motorcar 
companies expanded or launched into aircraft engine manufacture. Finally, a few of 
these companies produced an even newer weapon – the tank. The war brought a great 
expansion for the European motorcar industry and millions of people became much 
more familiar with automobiles. Many companies demonstrated a great flexibility in 
shifting their output to a wide variety of products as demanded by their war ministries. 
Then, by 1917 and in some cases earlier, the military officials decided that 
standardization would work for them too, and they strived for more concentration on a 
limited range of trucks, aircraft engines and munitions.  
 3.1 France 
In the French case the automobile industry played a prominent role in the war. Few of 
its factories were in the area occupied by German forces in the north, although the 
output of the important group of foundries along the Belgian frontier was lost and the 
Peugeot shops around Montebéliard were threatened but never overrun. Early in the war 
most of the companies began to make artillery shells, but André Citroen was more 
successful. The French Army gave him a large contract in February 1915, and Citroen 
quickly built a large factory in Paris and began production in mid 1915. Citroen´s 
extensive mechanization and assembly lines for sectioning the process allowed him to 
pursue an extreme division of the labor, and thereby utilize many unskilled workers, 
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especially women. By November 1915 one-fifth of his 3,500 workers were female, and 
at the armistice the proportion had risen to one-half of 11,700 workers.87 Citroen´s 
26million shells, his factory location in Paris, and his innovations in production and 
labor policy brought him much favorable attention. He became a national hero and he 
decided to adapt his factory to mass produced cars after the war. His company made 
shells, various types of trucks, artillery tractors, aviation engines and light tanks. 
Renault put these products together in its own shops, which at the war´s end employed 
some 22,500 workers, but more and more of the parts for them came from 
subcontractors. Renault’s aircraft engines and tanks were made by outside firms like 
Peugeot and Berliet. Government pressure forced the auto and other metalworking firms 
to work together in groups to make complex items. This arrangement of military 
product groups worked well and helps to explain how the French outproduced the 
British and Germans in automotive equipment such as trucks and aviation engines.88 
Peugeot also produced a variety of war materiel, including some trucks, aircraft engines 
and some engines for Renault tanks, but this firm did not expand nearly as fast as 
Renault or Berliet. In Lyon, Berliet produced millions of shells but concentrated more in 
vehicle manufacturing, ultimately producing 25,000 trucks, as the French authorities 
moved further toward standardization in trucks than British, Germans or Americans. 
One of the outstanding wartime manufacturing achievements in France was the 
production of nearly 90,000 aircraft engines, more than twice the total of either Britain 
or Germany. When the war began, the two leading types were the Gnôme and Rhône 
(G&R) and the Renault engine. However, the G&R engine proved unsuitable to the 
war’s needs and the authorities ordered more Renault engines, based in the Hispano-
Suize design. Since the firm Hispano-Suize was not able to produce the necessary 
amount of engines, the French military ordered fourteen other French firms, including 
the automobile makers Peugeot, Brasier, De Dion-Bouton, Belleville and DFP to 
manufacture the Hispano-Suize engines. Unfortunately, parts on those engines produced 
by different firms usually were not interchangeable. Altogether some 20 prewar French 
automobile makers engaged the aircraft engines during the war89.  
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 3.2 Britain 
The British automobile industry did not expand as much as the French, nor did it exhibit 
as much as flexibility. English Ford continued to assemble vehicles shipped from North 
America, some as cars but many adapted to serve as ambulances or light trucks.  
Austin Company made primarily war material: shells, artillery guns, aircraft, 
ambulances, trucks and armored cars. Most of these came from two large factory 
buildings constructed and equipped by the Ministry of Munitions90. The majority of the 
truck markers expanded their output and a dozen of them made between 1,000 to 5,000 
trucks per year during the war, but the Associated Equipment Company supplied the 
largest number of trucks: about 10,000. It was the first British-owned motor vehicle 
firm to set up a moving assembly line91. The British government entrusted tank 
manufacturing primarily to a railway-car firm, the Metropolitan Carriage Wagon 
Company, which assembled the 70% of the 2,600 produced along with Foster. The 
English Daimler company supplied most of the tank engines. British production of 
aircraft engines expanded very slowly. Before the war, the G&F engines from France 
dominated the British aviation and the unavailability of some interchangeable parts also 
delayed the industry’s growth.  
 
 3.3 Italy 
The Italian army took advantage of nine months of neutrality to continue its 
motorization before it entered the war. By May 1915 it possessed 3,500 trucks and 
ambulances, mostly Fiats92. This company’s vehicles found almost unlimited markets 
both at home and for its allies. Fiat produced about 45,650 trucks during the war, by far 
the largest total in the world.93 In addition to the standard truck models, Fiat made a 
great variety of other military supplies, including buses, artillery tractors and machine 
guns. It also built some 15,000 aircraft engines. Fiat itself produced all the parts used in 
these vehicles and engines. It did not have a moving assembly line but did continue its 
prewar evolution toward making interchangeable parts on single-purpose machines 
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operated by unskilled labor. By the end of 1917, Fiat’s many factories employed some 
40,000 (compared to the prewar number of 4,000) and substantial shares of these were 
women and young boys. The other Italian auto firms made much smaller numbers of 
vehicles during the war, in particular trucks for specialized purposes. Isotta Fraschini 
produced a considerable number of powerful aircraft engines that earned a good 
reputation, as did those of Fiat. Allied observers in 1917 found the engines of these two 
firms reliable and standardized with interchangeable parts.94  
 
Chart 6: Military Production during the First World War 
  Britain France Germany Italy 
Vehicles produced 59,000 66,000 60,000 55,000 
Vehicles in service in 1918 87,000 91,000 56,000 36,000 
 
Note: numbers excludes tanks and motorcycles  
Source: Friedson, P. (1978) pp.130-165 
 
 3.4 Germany 
The German motor-vehicle industry engaged heavily in military production95, but 
showed less adaptability than the French or Italian. Trucks and aircrafts engines were 
main products. The largest firm, Benz, cut back on passenger car production to as low 
as 213 units in 1918, and truck output did not expand, remaining steady at 1,100 to 
1,300 per year. In the 1915 the Prussian War Ministry persuaded Benz to take financial 
control of the Aviatik aircraft factory in Leipzig, but this connection did not seem to 
have much effect on the motor’s firm Mannheim activities. At Mannheim it produced 
11,300 aircraft engines during the war, but Benz engines were not among the best. Benz 
also received orders for submarine diesel engines and became major supplier of them. 
Over the course of the war its employment rose from 7,700 to 16,000 workers.  
Similar developments occurred at Daimler, where passenger-car output dropped to 108 
units in 1918 and truck production rose to nearly 1,000 models in that year. Daimler’s 
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primary wartime achievement came with aviation engines, and became country’s 
leading producer throughout the war. Its Mercedes engines were heavier then the French 
engines, but more reliable, durable, and simpler to maintain. Daimler delivered 19,876 
of the estimated 41,200 aircraft engines made in wartime96. Peak employment in the 
Daimler factories reached 25,000 workers, surpassing the Renault, France’s largest 
automotive employer, but was well below Fiat. Factory organization changed little at 
Daimler during the war, although the concentration on just few types of aircrafts at 
Untertürkheim97 permitted more single-purpose machines and the greater use of 
unskilled men and women. However, a scandal erupted at Daimler early in 1918. In 
February the direction wrote to the War Ministry that unless Daimler received higher 
prices for its engines (because of higher labor, and material costs, night work and 
overtime), the output would fall. The company however refused to submit detailed 
calculations to support its claims. This letter became known to the Reichstag. The 
military authorities reacted in March 1918 by placing Daimler under military 
supervision, but even after the army took control, troubles continued at Daimler. The 
company’s shortage of certain parts led the military to demand these parts to be 
subcontracted.  
Opel became a major German truck builder during the war, turning out 4,400 vehicles. 
This concern also made aircraft engines, first a design of the small Argus Company and 
then the exceptionally good BMW on license. BMW (Bayerische Motoren Werke) of 
Munich had made motorcycles, but it presented a fine aircraft engine in the middle of 
the war. It made 734 of these engines and Opel made 2,260 more. Other German auto 
firms also made a few thousand trucks during the war, but none produced them in really 
large numbers as did Fiat and Berliet. The War Ministry could not seem to act on the 
idea of making one or two standard models98.  
The difficulties the German army experienced in using trucks early in the war, 
emphasized the immense problems in providing spare part and repair for all the 
different models. The Prussian War Ministry reacted in 1915 by establishing norms for 
automobile parts and also provided specifications for a standard truck99. These 
beginning moves toward standardization allowed simpler production methods and more 
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use of less skilled labor. Such dilution of work occurred, but apparently to a lesser 
degree than was in the case in the Allied countries.  
 
4. The period between 1920’s and 1930’s 
In the 1920’s, the American automobile industry scored some huge gains. Output of 
cars and trucks rose from 65,000 in 1908 to 2.27 million in 1920 and the number of 
motor vehicles in service multiplied from 198,400 to 9.24 million over the same 
period100. Production innovations lay behind this growth, and also the lower cost of 
manufacturing and massive use of low-skilled workers. During the First World War, 
American car production boomed although raw-material shortages required a cutback in 
1918. More and more American vehicles were exported to Europe (trucks and cars), 
especially Fords. The United States production was about 19 times larger than that of 
still-recovering Europe. Before the thread of American conquest of the European auto 
industry (by assembly in Europe of American-made parts, and by manufacture in 
Europe by American firms), the European manufactures followed positive and negative 
policies101. Positively, they adopted many American production methods 
(Fordism/Taylorism) and imported American machine tools to raise output and reduce 
costs. To sell their expanded output of cars, they also adapted American marketing 
strategies, such as exclusive dealerships, installment sales, widespread advertising, and 
sales campaigns. Negatively, European auto makers lobbied their governments to 
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Chart 7: Motor vehicle production 1921-1929 
  France Britain Germany Italy 
1921 55,000     15,000 
1923 110,000 95,000   23,000 
1925 177,000 167,000 69,000 49,000 
1927 191,000 212,000 124,000 55,000 
1929 254,000 239,000 134,000 55,000 
 
Source: Laux, James, et Al (1982), p70. 
Note: the blank fields are due to huge differences between authors leading to 
inconclusive numbers.  
 
The American assembly plants established in Europe in the 1920s were responding to 
raising tariffs on automobile parts. In product policy European producers moved away 
from American-style cars. As the American models grew larger, more powerful and 
more luxurious, the Europeans produced smaller and less expensive cars, following 
their car market as it shifted downward in the economic scale.  
France and Britain shared the leadership of the European industry in the 1920s, each 
producing about 250,000 motor vehicles in 1929. The French market, weaker than 
Britain’s before war, strengthened and now absorbed more than the British. The 
national economy generally was prosperous and car prices, in real terms, fell some 40% 
from 1921 to 1930. The domestic demand, which compensated the decline in exports 
after 1925, was small in the countryside but stronger in towns, where the lack of public 
transport made personal cars especially useful. Imported cars did not play an important 
role in France, as the tariff now reached 45%102. The annual tax on cars continued to 
discriminate against those with large engines (especially from America) and now also 
covered trucks and buses.  
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 4.1 France 
In 1926 Citroen established small assembly plants in Britain, Italy, Germany and 
Belgium. Foreign assembly rather than export of the complete car had several 
advantages: shipping costs were less, parts sometimes paid lower tariffs, some parts 
could be purchased locally, and local tastes might be met by slight design changes. Of 
the automakers that would become the French Big Three, Peugeot had the most trouble 
producing cars in the immediate postwar years103.  
 As early as 1923 the French Big Three made over half the country’s motor vehicles and 
in 1929 their market share reached 74%104. The concentration typical of the auto 
industry was proceeding apace. Sales of trucks generally in France almost stopped for 
several years as military surplus trucks (French and American) were sold in the market 
at bargain prices. Some other firms aimed at the luxury models, others tried to compete 
with the large companies in the low and middle price ranges, and still others gradually 
shifted to trucks and special-purpose vehicles. Some of these firms left the market 
entirely in the 1920s and 1930s, pressed by competition from major companies and their 
lack of resources to modernize production.  
 
 4.2 Britain 
British developments in the 1920s resembled those of France: expansion of the 
automobile market and dominance of it by a small number of producers who gradually 
adopted flow production methods and assembly lines. Car prices dropped, falling more 
than 30% from 1924 to 1930. Britain gave up its role as a large market for other major 
producers’ exports. The McKenna tariff of 1915 (33.3%) on foreign passenger cars and 
parts had a protective effect. This was not so in 1919 and 1920 when domestic 
manufacturers made few cars or again in 1924-25 when the tariff was briefly rescinded. 
But the share of imports in total domestic sales of passenger cars trended downward, 
reaching 12.8% in 1929. The United States and Canada (whose cars paid a 22.2% tariff) 
                                                           
103 Henri, Daniel (1993), p34. 
104 Loubet, Jean (2001)  pp. 152-156. 
Eduardo Gaspar Silva  Universidade Católica Portuguesa 
Master in European Studies – Instituto de Estudos Europeus  Page 37 
were the major suppliers. Export of motor vehicles from Britain exceeded imports from 
1926 on.  
 
 4.3 Germany 105 
The auto industry in Germany took longer to recover from the war and postwar 
dislocations that it did in France and Britain. Many difficulties inundated it until 1924-
25, and output fluctuated around a low-level. A more normal situation then followed 
and in 1927-29 the business was rising, only to fall into a sharp depression in the early 
1930s. The ownership of the auto companies went through a complicated shuffling that 
finally led to an outcome with one major producer, six or eight making a few thousand 
each, and some specialist firms making small quantities.  
The industry’s major problem in the early 1920s was on the demand side, because after 
the war the middle class hesitated to buy cars in the face of uncertainty. Prices rose in 
1919 and then again in 1921-22, leading into the galloping inflation of 1923. Only at the 
end of that year the currency stabilized and by then many Germans had lost their 
savings. Agricultural incomes were low, so little demand came from rural and small 
towns in Germany. A 15% luxury tax imposed at passenger cars also weakened the 
market, until the tax was finally abolished in 1926. On the other hand, at some points 
during the inflation period foreign exchange rates were such that Germany vehicles 
became bargains for foreigners, and many were exported – for example, thousands of 
surplus military trucks.  
There were difficulties on the supply side also. In 1919 and 1920 traditional labor 
discipline broke down, a situation triggered by the military defeat and the revolution of 
1918, which discredited the ruling elites and authority generally. At the same time came 
news from Communist Russia where workers had seized control of land and factories. 
In this context labor disputes were frequent, often set off by price inflation and by such 
particular issues as the end of wartime contracts, which required sharp cuts in 
employment. Raw materials, including coal, which many of the larger firms burned to 
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generate their own electric power, ran short. The loss of the Saar and Upper Silesia was 
an important loss for the German industry as shows one of the first Hitler’s speeches106.  
 It took time to rebuild supply and sales networks and to design new models. Almost all 
car imports were banned for several years – a policy aimed at saving foreign exchange, 
but one that protected the weak domestic industry from competition as well. It also 
delayed modernization of design and production. 
 
 4.3.1 Diesel Engines 
The German auto industry led the way in an important new development, the 
automotive diesel engine. Before the First World War the European navies began to 
install diesel engines in submarines. The MAN firm developed a relatively light model 
used in most German submarines during the war. After the war, MAN and Benz strove 
to apply diesel engines to automotive use to replace high-cost gasoline. By the end of 
the decade some 310 trucks used diesel engines in Germany, and the technology was 
under development in other parts of Europe107.  
 
 4.4 Italy 
The Italian motorcar industry in the 1920s was a matter of Fiat along with a handful of 
specialist producers. Just after the war Italian industry was marked by considerable 
labor agitation. A series of strikes occurred in several production plants and radicalism 
spread quickly. The postwar recession soon led to layoffs and a further weakening of 
the labor movement108. The fear that labor’s actions generated among the middle and 
wealthy classes in 1919 and 1920 brought support to nationalist and fascist movements. 
In 1922 the Fascists won, and Mussolini became prime minister.   
The Fiat Company continued its policies of integration and diversification in the 
interwar years. It exported to Britain, Switzerland, Australia and Spain, the 
contemporary leading markets. Italy and Fiat took up the role of prewar France, 
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exporting a large share of output, because the domestic Italian market could not absorb 
anywhere near the firm’s productive capacity.  
Italy’s other automakers competed in the middle and upper ranges of the market at 
home and abroad. Ford had begun assembly at a modest rate in Italy in 1922 and 
purchased land in Livorno for a bigger operation. Pressed by Fiat, Mussolini forbade 
Ford to proceed, unless it could operate with 100% Italian manufacture. When Ford 
tried to form a union with Isotta Fraschinni, Mussolini again objected, and Ford backed 
away, settling for assembly of a few imports. Italy’s automotive production growth 
stopped after 1926 as a recession set in, average incomes remained low, and none of the 
manufacturers tried to market a really small and cheap car. Imports that might have 
been competitive were restricted. 
 
4.5 Other areas of Europe 
Domestic automakers in the rest of Europe were of comparatively minor importance. In 
countries with low tariffs, automakers could not compete with imports; in protectionists, 
however, the market was not large enough for efficient production. Some firms found 
an answer by manufacturing medium-size and large trucks, where mass production was 
not feasible because purchasers had special requirements109.  
 
5. The period between 1930 and 1938 
The American producers dominated the automobile industry in the 1920s, in 1929 
making 5.3 million motor vehicles while output in the four large Western European 
countries was 682,000, just 13% of U.S. production. Toward the end of the 1930s the 
situation had changed. The European total in 1937 had raised to 1.1 million, 23% of the 
American 4.8 million vehicles110. The American decline was countered by the European 
growth of 62%. A major reason for this European improvement was the Great 
Depression, which in America went deeper and lasted longer than in most of Europe. In 
Britain it did not hit hard, and by 1934 the economy was climbing above its output of 
the late 1920s. The cycle in Germany was quite different, a very deep depression by 
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1932 followed by rapid emergence from this gap. The French economy slid into 
depression in 1931, and although France did not suffer a serious decline, significant 
expansion came only in 1939. Italy went through a minor contraction and, starting in 
1935, experienced growth above the levels of the 1920s.  
The advancing prosperity in Britain and Germany, and to a lesser degree in Italy and 
France, helps to explain the expanding automobile output. In economic terms, annually 
from 1925 through 1938 there was almost a perfect correlation between national product 
and motor vehicle production in Germany, Britain, France and Italy111. Also pushing 
higher output were lower car prices, with the adoption of mass-production methods in 
the later 1920s and to manufactures’ increasing emphasis on small cars.  
 
 5.1 Britain 
During the depression Britain experienced serious unemployment problems in certain 
locations and some industries but the economy as a whole did not suffer anything like 
the economic disasters in Germany or the United States112. Motor vehicle production 
dropped only 5.4% from 1929 to 1931 and then rose regularly, reaching more than 
double the 1929 level in 1937. British auto output overtook France and led Europe from 
1930 on. The continued health of British economy kept strong the demand for cars113. 
Prices for food and other imported products fell, leaving more disposable income for 
middle-class people, who were the car buyers. The serious unemployment of coal 
miners and textile workers did not have a direct effect on the car market because these 
people had not received enough income when employed to purchase many cars. 
Production costs and car prices continue to decline as imported raw materials cost less 
and more efficient production methods were introduced. Exports rose as the pound 
sterling was devalued and as more countries discriminated against American 
competition by taxing cars114.  
It has been observed that when the average annual wage in a country first exceeds the 
retail price of a popular family car, the country has reached the point of takeoff for a 
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rapid increase in car sales.115 This does not mean that those who receive the average 
wage can now afford a car, but that the relationship of incomes and prices is such, that a 
large number of consumers can (and did) buy cars. This wage-price relationship 
occurred in 1929 in the United States; in Britain it arrived in 1935.  
The concentration that characterized the British auto industry by the end of the 1920s, in 
which Morris and Austin together held 60% of the passenger car market, declined in the 
1930s. The tow leading firms did sell more cars, but lost market share to four others – 
Ford, Standard, Rootes and Vauxhall. This surprising development came as a result of 
errors by Morris and Austin, as well as vigorous competition by others. British exports 
expanded in the 1930s, almost entirely to Commonwealth countries, where they paid a 
lower tariff than their American or continental competitors.  
 
 5.2 Germany 
The rapid expansion of German motor-vehicle production in the 1930’s stands out in the 
history of this industry between the world wars. At first, production fell sharply during 
the depression, back to the low level of the early 1920s. Then, from late 1932 the 
economy began to revive and the automobile industry rose with it for the rest of the 
decade. Motor vehicle output actually rose much faster than did industry in general, 
stimulated by the Hitler regime’s motorization policy. Growth also came from 
investment by General Motors and Ford in their German subsidiaries and their vigorous 
marketing. 
Economic recovery in Germany began with government public work programs. The 
Nazi government greatly expanded these when it came to power late in January 1933 
with a massive road building and repair program, as well as the construction of public 
buildings in order to face the “millions of the industrial proletariat that are unemployed 
and starving”116 . This policy aimed at cutting the very high level of unemployment and 
it did succeed, as almost a million workers were engaged in road and transportation 
construction in 1934.  
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When Hitler assumed the German chancellorship in January 1933, 34% of Germany's 
work force was unemployed. By 1936, before Hitler's rearmament program took hold of 
the economy, most of the jobless had disappeared from official unemployment statistics. 
Silverman117 concludes that the recovery in Germany between 1933 and 1936 was real, 
not simply the product of statistical trickery and the stimulus of rearmament, and that 
Nazi work creation programs played a significant role118. This means that Hitler 
government’s success in the battle for work represented more than a victory for the 
technical labor market policy. It marked a triumph in psychological and spiritual 
reconstruction.  
One of the few specific estimates of the importance of government activities in the 1933 
recovery, came from Reich economics minister Kurt Schmitt, formerly a leading figure 
in Germany’s insurance industry. Schmitt estimated that up to a third of the 
improvement during 1933 resulted from public measures119. More important had been a 
real, broad-based improvement originating in the economy itself. Hitler also began 
rearmament program, but this required more planning and more caution in the early 
years because of its intentional risk. By 1935 rearmament was well under way and was 
one of the strongest forces pulling the economy forward. Road building, including the 
expressways or autobahns, indirectly encouraged the auto industry, but Hitler did more 
than this. In April 1933 his regime eliminated annual taxes on new motorcars, which 
reduced the annual expense of operating a car by 10 to 15%. Latter, industrial firms, 
farmers, businessman, and professionals received tax rebates on the purchase of new 
motor vehicles. Automobile sales had begun to climb late in 1932 and they shot upward 
in the following year. Employment in the motor-vehicle industry almost tripled from 
34,400 in 1932 to 101,000 in 1935120 and production of cars and truck rose almost five 
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 5.2.1 The Volkswagen project121  
Hitler made mass motorization one of his policies in Germany. Hitler’s unofficial 
advisor on motorcar matters, Jacob Werlin, brought him together with Ferdinand 
Porsche in 1934. Hitler asked Porsche to analyze the feasibility of producing a people’s 
car to sell at a price fewer than 1,000 marks. Hitler went ahead on this basis and asked 
the German Automobile Manufacturers Association to develop this project with Porsche 
as designer. The project had many delays and seeing that, Hitler in February 1937 
assigned the Volkswagen program to the German Labor Front, the Nazi labor 
organization, with Porsche, Werlin and Bodo Lafferentz of the Labor Front. A small 
plant was established in Brunswick to begin making parts, and in a rural area east of 
Hannover the Labor Front began construction of a huge factory to build Volkswagens as 
well as a town to house the workers.  To reduce costs and to raise public interest, the 
government decided that buyers would pay in advance for their Volkswagens by 
purchasing weekly saving stamps from the Labor Front and pasting them in a book.  
Most of the historians argue that the Nazi regime’s motorization policy was essentially a 
veiled program of rearmament. The autobahn construction program also has been 
characterized a military policy. The autobahns were more elaborate than the Italian 
autostrade. Government financed the autobahns (without tolls), and traffic was heavier 
than in the Italian case.  
Evidence has not appeared that the routes were laid out for strategic reasons or that 
construction began on those with the most significant military use122. American experts 
that examined the system in the 1930s considered that it had primarily civilian aims 
rather than military ones, pointing out that some stretches of the road and viaducts were 
built to be as spectacular as possible, not hidden as military road would be. Though, 
latter in the war the autobahn tunnels and narrow cuts were used to shelter military 
productions facilities and to house war prisoners.  
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 5.3 France 
The French automobile industry in the 1930s took quite a different route from Britain or 
Germany. Its output did decline during the depression to 1932. It revived thereafter but 
never surpassed its 1929 production before the Second World War. This evolution 
paralleled the movement of national economy, and the primary reason for the stagnation 
of the industry’s output must be ascribed to weakness on the demand side. The 
industry’s resilience was further weakened by a failure of the major firms to play the 
card of the very small car in this decade. Each one of them by 1935 had designed a very 
small model, but Citroen and Peugeot doubted to introduce these cars and persuaded 
Renault to abandon its efforts also. In the truck area of the market, French producers 
had great difficulties. Government budgets cuts meant smaller government purchases. 
Private firms were affected by an economy that discouraged capital investment and by 
1934 legislation to reduce truck and bus competition with the railways.  
The economy’s failure to revive itself made the competition harder to accept, and the 
requirement that the government subsidize the railway’s losses forced it to try to protect 
them from too much road competition. A decree-law of April 1934 stopped the creation 
of new bus lines or commercial truck services and encouraged the negotiation of local 
transport coordination agreements. These agreements provided that the railways would 
give up their short lines and investments in truck and bus firms and that the road haulers 
would renounce long-distance freight and passenger traffic. The continuing economic 
stagnation probably had a greater effect on truck sales in France than did the 
anticompetitive policy. Truck sales failed to reach the level of the late 1920s before 
1938. 
 
 5.4 Italy  
The Italian automobile industry suffered seriously in the early years of the depression. 
In the late 1920s about half its output had been exported, but the higher tariffs, and 
small import quotas set up in much of Europe in 1930 smothered most of this trade. 
Italian auto exports plunged from 28,000 in 1928 to 7,000 in 1933. Fiat, comprising 
about 85% of the industry had to react, because its production fell from 48,000 in 1929 
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to 19,000 in 1931123. Fiat’s strategy was to introduce cheaper cars to expand the very 
limited domestic market and to move toward assembly and manufacture abroad to avoid 
the tariffs and quotas.  
 The low-priced models of Fiat, revived the Italian auto exports, which in 1937 rose 
close to late 1920s levels. The smaller cars were especially popular in Sweden, 
Switzerland and Britain, and several hundred even found their way to the United States. 
Italy’s peak production year of 1937 surpassed its earlier record of 1926. Fiat models 
made in Germany by NSU/Fiat amounted to about 5,000 per year from 1937 to 1939124, 
but in France Simca made at least 20,000 annually in these years. In addition to several 
models of cars, Fiat in the 1930s also produced a variety of gasoline and diesel trucks, 
aircraft engines and aircraft, and even small tanks. Its best years for trucks were 1936 
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6. Second World War 
6.1 Germany 
German regime expected that war would be a series of limited and short conflicts, so at 
first the motor vehicle industry sharply cut output of passenger cars but did not fully 
engage in war production. Great efforts did come in 1942 but even these did not require 
the full capacity of the industry. One of the biggest concerns was petroleum supplies. 
Specialists of the Reich state that there were no evidence of a systematic plan to devote 
the automotive industry to military ends, but rather a conversion by fits and starts. 
Sometimes this was due to unforeseen problems such as the poor roads in the Soviet 
Union that required more trucks and tractors that anticipated. 
The German army comprised 165 divisions by the spring of 1940, of which 10 were 
armored, and 6 were motorized infantry. An armored division had around 250 tanks, 
560 cars, 1,400 trucks and 1,300 motorcycles. A motorized infantry was assigned with 
1,000 cars, 1,700 trucks and 1,300 motorcycles, while a standard division required 5000 
horses, 600 to 1.000 trucks and cars and 500 motorcycles125. An impressive fact is that 
German army mobilized 2.7 million horses during the Second World War. 
As German men were in combat, the Reich had to find new sources of labor to the 
automobile industry, such as women, foreign man and women, and in some cases 
prisoners, and Jews. This kind of unskilled workers shows how far the German industry 
had gone in dividing jobs into simple tasks. In 1944 the Daimler-Benz main factory, 
Untertürkhein126, had about 15,700 workers, 5,300 of them were foreign and 1,200 were 
soviet woman. Evidence suggests that forced labor didn’t play an important role in 
production, because the productivity in the concentration camps or prisons was about 10 
times less than a regular factory, and the costs of transferring machinery to the camps or 
prisons did not compensate the saving of using non paid workers127. 
General Motors (Opel) and Ford lost the control over their German subsidiaries during 
the war. The Reich took over these firms and ruled them under local authorities.  The 
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Opel’s factory in Brandenburg assembled about 70,000 trucks throughout the war128, 
while in the Rüsselsheim plant most of it was shifted to made parts for aircraft engines. 
The maximum wartime employment was 16,000 workers. Ford had built a plant in 
Berlin in 1939 to assemble trucks and to assemble armored cars, just before the war 
begun. At the Cologne plant, total production of Ford mounted around 80,000 vehicles. 
Ford and Opel had excellent facilities and consolidated experience at mass production, 
but none of their factories was converted to tank manufacture because of the Regime’s 
suspicious about their foreign connections.  
BMW had two plants in Eisenach were it produced cars, motorcycles and trucks, but 
curiously also the American aircraft engine Pratt&Whitney, licensed just before the 
war129. At Munich, BMW operations focused in their own aircraft engine development 
and also its production. Maybach had to stop producing luxury cars and produced most 
of the tank engines in the wartime. Due to the risk of depending on this single source, 
the Government contracted also Auto Union to make tank’s engines as second source. 
The decision seemed right, because in 1944 the Maybach factory was completely 
destroyed by a bombing. Although other Auto Union factories produced motorcycles, 
cars, trucks and aircraft engines for the war artillery, the plants were never used in their 
full capacity. The MAN truck factory in Nuremberg also produced tanks, but did not 
resume its manufacture only to tanks. It also produced diesel engines for submarines.  
The Volkswagen factory produced about 70,000 all-road vehicles, aircraft parts, flying 
bombs, mines and other items, but like Auto Union, it never operated at more than half 
capacity during the war130. Scholars wonder if this failure to convert to full military 
production seemed to have directly with Führer’s desire to have the factory ready to 
make the Volkswagen car as soon as possible after the war. From other side, evidences 
of shortages, scarcities of machine tools and parts, and air raids were possibly the most 
important problems to these plants to achieve full capacity131. From August 1944 on, 
most of the automobile plants were damaged by air bombings. The usual time to a 
factory to recover its production varied from 2 to 12 weeks after the attack132, which 
meant that only continuous air raids could keep them out of production. To evidence the 
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consequence of the attacks, in the first quarter of 1944 Germany produced about 26,000 
trucks, and in the last quarter of the year it produced only 12,000 due to the air attacks.  
6.2 Italy 
The prewar effort on producing light tanks did not end in the best way, because these 
tanks were no match for the British and American tanks they met in North Africa133. 
The Italian army had to reequip its armored forces with heavier and more powerful 
tanks, produced by Fiat and Ansaldo134.   
Fiat continued to increase its truck production, and by the time Mussolini joined 
Germany in the war, Fiat produced around 10,700 trucks in 1940, 12,500 in 1941 and 
10,600 in 1942. The numbers of 1942 can be explained by the damaged cause by a 
series of British bombings raids on the major North Italian industrial plants. The 
recovery was slow and in February 1943 the production was still 40% of the normal 
output135. Workers took advantage of the prevailing defeatism to do a strike in March 
1943, which spread throughout Italy. However, scholars point that the bombing played a 
major role in ending Italy’s participation in the war136. When in July 1943 Mussolini 
abandoned the power, the German military forces took control of northern and central 
Italy. Fiat and other automobile companies continued their production for the rest of the 
war but at a reduced level. 
6.3 France 
Panhard and Renault made several armored cars, while Renault, Citroen, Peugeot, 
Berliet and other firms built trucks of various models. Engines for military aircraft came 
from Gnôme&Rône and Hispano-Suize137.  
The military motor transport plan by the French army was to increase the existing 
number of 60,000 vehicles, with 240,000 civilian cars and trucks requested and 
gradually retire the poorer civilian vehicles. In May 1940, French army received about 
35,000 new vehicles, 7,000 of them came from the United States and even some from 
Fiat. In spite of this impressive number of vehicles, Germany moved faster in the 
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conflict and prevailed in the May-June campaign, defeating France by its fault of 
planning and unaggressive leadership138. Defeated, France had to give about 700,000 
cars and trucks to the Nazis, and its industry worked to fill German military needs.  The 
occupied France’s motor-vehicle production was very small compared with the prewar 
numbers. The main reasons were the shortages of materials, bombing attacks of the 
Allies and also resistance and sabotage by French workers and managers.  
During the Occupation, in the French factories both owners and workers faced a 
complicated moral dilemma: working to fulfill the German army’s needs meant helping 
France’s enemy, but keeping the factory producing meant providing employment and 
income to workers, as well as less chances of the machinery be shipped to Germany139. 
The disappearance of most cars and trucks from French cities was a consequence of the 
German requisition for petroleum and motor vehicles, and life in Paris became difficult 
without many personal cars, taxis or buses. Those who lost their vehicles had to use the 
crowded Metro, but it became unreliable in 1944 and 1945 because the subway system 
depended on electricity, which was also scarce. Then, for personal transportation most 
people used bicycles or some of the existing horse taxis. 
6.4 Britain  
British rearmament began early, when in 1936 the Government decided that the country 
would need more engines and airplanes than the industry could deliver with its current 
facilities140. Britain began a program, building and equipping a number of new factories 
that could begin aircraft production quickly in case of emergency. Automobile 
executives were asked to manage most of these plants because the Government assumed 
that they had more skilled managerial personnel available than those of the aircraft 
companies. Austin and Rootes would operate airframe companies, while Daimler, 
Humber, Standard and Rover would manage engine plants making Bristol engines. All 
these were in production when the war began. Of the 100,000 Bristol engines made 
during the war, two thirds came from plants operated by automobile companies141. To 
meet an increasing demand for other types of aircraft engines, the Merlins, the English 
Ford company with Government funds built and equipped a new factory near 
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Manchester. The British also contracted the Pakard Motor Company in Detroit to make 
thousands of these engines too. Rolls-Royce began producing jet engines in 1943 and 
although they proved to be inferior to the German jet fighters, this meant that Rolls-
Royce gained a head start in the jet engine business.  
Regarding tanks, the British army had few of them by 1939, consequence of a policy 
not to send a large army to the continent, of higher priorities for the navy and air force 
and of disagreements over the type of tanks to make142. Also, the few tanks produced in 
the first years of war lacked good engines. America helped to overcome this situation by 
building many tanks and supplying them to the British, as we can see in Normandy 
where two thirds of the tanks of the British armored divisions were American.  
When the war begun, the War Office demanded civilian cars and trucks and had the 
supply from Canada with 386,000 motor vehicles during the wartime. The United States 
also supplied with 260,000, in addition to those 434,000 produced in Britain. 
 
Chart 8: Automobile Production 1940 to 1944 
  Trucks Cars Total 
Britain 538,500 140,000 678,500 
Germany 465,000 184,500 649,500 
 
Source: Rostas, L. (1999), p46. 
 
Chart 8 shows us how the output totals are surprisingly close to each other, and the aid 
from North America to Britain was almost balanced by the vehicles the Germans took 
from the occupied zones. With a smaller army, the British forces were much more 
motorized than Germany during the war. British automobile industry also produced all 
sorts of military equipment, as mines, agricultural tractors; aircraft repair machines and 
small artillery.  
With the proliferation of multinational companies, a particular aspect of the Second 
World War industry occurred.  The same companies in different factories produced 
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equipment on both sides of the conflict. There were German and Italian-owned firms 
producing to Britain and the United States, as the case of Bosh in Germany and Fiat 
assembly plant in Britain. Also General Motors/Opel and Ford went through the same 
situation143. 
 
7. Recovery of the World War 
Most of the industrial plants across Europe suffered from air bombings, but the costs of 
repairing roofs and walls were usually cheaper than the complicated machine tools that 
were the most expensive part of an automobile industry. Fortunately it was necessary 
that a bomb hit directly the machine to destroy it, so even though the factories seemed 
seriously damaged many machines were intact.  
Germany, Britain and Italy actually had more machine tools at the end of the war than at 
the beginning144. Britain made many tools during the war and received also many from 
the United States, while in Germany the number of machines rose from 1.5 million to 
2.3 million during the war, were the German regime took about 80,000 machine tools 
from France and other occupied countries. After the war, Germany lost many machines 
as war reparations and some 58,000 machines have been destroyed by allied bombings. 
France ended the war with fewer machines and those who were left were already 
obsolete. All the countries faced several complications with raw materials, especially 
steel. The recovery years also faced a new management challenge, where persons like 
Austin, Peugeot, Citroen, Renault, Porsche and many others were departing, leaving the 
their companies to new managers145. 
 
7.1 Britain 
After the war ended, the automobile companies were still under Government’s control. 
With the Labor party leading, it required that the automobile industry should export a 
higher proportion of their production in order to obtain more foreign exchange. To 
enforce this policy, government allocation of steel was proportional to the amount of 
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exports, or in other words, who exported most would have more steel. Because of the 
characteristics of the American cars (expensive, heavy and too big), British carmakers 
were welcome in the world markets. Exports rose also because in many countries new 
cars were not available since 1940. 
This initial success had however a drawback, because the only cars that the British firms 
had available for export were those designed in the 1930s for domestic service 
(designed for slow speeds and good roads). The hard usage these cars experienced and 
the inadequate service facilities overseas brought them a poor reputation, making them 
vulnerable to the competition of the German manufacturers146.  
 
7.2 France  
Some of the war benefits that France profited were the 50,000 military vehicles that the 
United States left, and were sold by many auto makers and dealers147. In other hand, the 
French automobile industry had to overcome some damage problems and to solve 
ownership issues. In the Vichy regime and after the war, government economic 
planning had to allocate scarce resources and improve efficiency. The Pons Plan of 
1945 made by the Ministry of Industrial Production, aimed to concentrate production 
among fewer firms and have them specialized in certain segments of the market but this 
plan never worked as desired148. While Peugeot’s tasks were to rebuild its physical plant 
and then find steel, Renault went through a complex change of ownership and 
management style. Lois Renault was arrested with the charge of dealing with the 
enemy; the President Charles de Gaulle requisitioned the Renault factories and ordered 
the nationalization of the company149. In order to justify the public ownership of 
Renault, the new administration hoped to make a “people’s car” as soon as possible, 
despite the pressure for exports to earn the foreign exchange France needed. Soon the 
small car was available, the Renault 4L, and it was ready for the post-war market. With 
a new model the company showed more vigor, it enabled it to focus more on motor 
vehicles. 
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Citroen continued to make the same vehicles that it had produced during the Occupation 
but introduced the 2CV model, more adapted to the new needs of the French population. 
Like other French companies, Simca began by turning out its prewar models by 
equipping the factories with new machinery with the aid of the Marshall Plan.  By 1949 
French motor-vehicle output had made its recovery and the structure of the industry had 
changed little, except for Renault150.  
 
7.3 Germany 
Germany was discouraged by the occupying powers to have a rebirth of its 
industrialism, and together with shortages of raw materials and destroyed transportation 
networks, industry and especially automobile production had a slow recovery after the 
war151. From the market side, the population suffered from the allied attacks and many 
persons had lost their financial capacity even to buy food152. Also the German producers 
didn’t have the capacity to offer a large number of small and cheap cars.  
The Brandenburg plant of Opel was lost. The factory was taken over by the East 
German regime and the machinery was shipped to the Soviet Union. Managing to 
overcome the years of weak economic situation and the lack of support of the Nazi 
regime, in the 1950 economic boom Opel made some 73,000 vehicles, five times more 
than the output of 1948153. The plants of Auto Union were all destroyed not because of 
the bombings but due to the newly designed East Germany where the auto companies 
were taken by the regime. Auto Union continued its production but in a smaller scale.  
Although Daimler-Benz facilities were one of the most destroyed in the war, slowly it 
managed to restart production with 214 models in 1946 and 831 in 1947154. The 
numbers progressively grew and when the Marienfelde plant in Berlin was rebuilt, 
Daimler-Benz produced 34,000 cars and 8,500 trucks in 1950. 
Volkswagen was the company that emerged from the war. The main factory was in the 
British zone of occupation and at the beginning there was no strategy to continue the 
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production, but after some repairs and to have realized that the factory could provide 
jobs for the refugees in the area, the British decided to continue the output of the 
original Volkswagen cars.  Already in 1947 the company was able to supply 20,000 cars 
to the British forces, to the United States, to the Soviet Army and also to the local 
German officials155. Since the Volkswagen was the only cheap car available in the 
market, the sales rose and the production in 1950 reached 90,600 cars. Despite the huge 
original investment, Volkswagen did not have to pay interest or dividends, so it could 
reinvest its profits in equipment repair and renewal. This was the only way to finance 
investment, as banks hesitated to lend money to these uncertain enterprises. 
Volkswagen was the output leader in Germany since 1945 and the country reached 
prewar production in 1951 thanks to Volkswagen156. The West German economy began 
to revive rapidly when most price and production restrictions were ended and there was 
a major currency reform. By 1951 the industry gained its prewar level of output, two or 
three years after the other major continental producers.  
 
7.4 Italy 
With its auto industry based in Fiat, the recovery in Italy was quite slow. After the war 
ended and the Germans withdrew from Turin, the Fiat leaders were accused by the local 
liberation committee of collaboration with the Nazi regime157. The executives were 
moved from their positions and replaced with a committee of new managers. 
Communists and socialists movements were trying to carry out a nationalization of Fiat 
and other major industries. For many reasons that did not happened, probably one of the 
major reasons was because Italians had already experienced trough Mussolini some 
company’s nationalization and realized that this policy did not deliver the utopia it 
promised. The new management committee had difficulties finding materials to expand 
production and needed to maintain the huge wartime level of employment. 
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Later, the charges against the old managers dropped and they returned to Fiat, except for 
Agnelli that died in December 1945. Fiat suffered from a series of strikes that weakened 
the production, made by the communist’s labor movements that were fearful of the 
American economic aid and influence158. As in other countries, the shortages of raw 
materials held back the automobile production and Italy was no exception. With the 
Marshall Plan aid, the conditions improved considerably and in 1949 the Italian 
production output regained the prewar levels. Because of the lack of variety in Fiat 
models, firms like Pininfarina, Bertone and Ghia start offering distinctiveness to these 
cars with a higher price. Their designs began to be famous and soon appeared other 
European and American companies that contracted them for designing new models.  
 
8. The period between 1950 and 1970159 
The second post war period saw the creation of a new world economic order, through 
international economic cooperation and internal economic policy that aimed to achieve 
stability and even prosperity, much like the belle époque period was. This period saw 
also the revolutionary socialists (or communists) that intended to recover, consolidate 
and expand the countries were socialism was growing. It was also the period where the 
least developed countries fought for their freedom from colonialism and aimed at 
economic development160.  
 
8.1 Britain161 
The British motor-vehicle leadership achieved in the immediate postwar years, was lost 
in the 1950s and its growth began to lag behind Europe’s other major producing 
countries. One of the reasons was the low reliability of British cars when submitted to 
intense usage, leading to frequent repair problems and weak service arrangements. The 
American and Australian market began to fall and other European countries also 
decreased their demand for British cars.  
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In the home market, the two largest British firms Nuffield and Austin merged in 1952 
creating the British Motor Corporation (BMC), claiming that would bring efficiencies 
of scale and would defend against the growing English Ford and Vauxhall. The BMC 
production plants were reorganized to produce more cars although with the same 
traditional machinery.  The failure to invest heavily in new types of machinery 
continued a policy of British-owned firms and it was the key to the latter difficulties at 
BMC. Noteworthy was the creation of the model Mini by BMC, which was introduced 
in the market in 1959 having a great demand at home, where the consumers continued 
to have preference for small cars. In the export market it also won popularity and most 
of the manufactured models were to export. However, due to poor cost accounting the 
car did not generate the profits it should have had.  
 
Chart 9 - Acquisitions and Mergers in the British Automobile Industry 1944-1968 
 
Source: Laux, James M. (1992); p180. 
 
The chart shows the period, in Britain, when automobiles sales didn’t grow and the 
smaller firms didn’t have the capacity to offer new models at competitive prices.  This 
period saw a series of mergers among the British-owned automobile companies. 
Through these mergers and acquisitions (many encouraged and subsidized by the 
British government162) in 1967 the British Leyland Motor Corporation was formed. The 
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new company at this stage was ranking the 5th largest automobile firm in the world after 
the American Big Three and Volkswagen. Ford proved to be the most successful 
automobile firm in Britain from the 1950s to the 1970s. The Americans encouraged it to 
have its own engineering staff and to hire academically trained staff, unlike BMC. The 
firm in 1967 reorganized its operations in Europe into one single company – Ford of 
Europe. It was a merger between the British and German firms because the trade 
barriers in Europe were shrinking. Ford of Europe would have one line of vehicles for 
the entire continent, with the design and manufacturing being made in the places where 
it could be done more efficiently. The Cortina model, completely designed in England, 
was very successful and it became the company’s largest seller in Britain trough 1987 
with 4.3 million, behind BMC Mini’s 5.1 million. 
Rolls-Royce emerged from the war as a manufacturer of jet engines. For several years it 
did not had competition from Germany or France, and it also took over the British 
competitors through a series of government encouragements. Despite the subsidies, 
Rolls-Royce went bankrupt in 1971 and it was nationalized by the government. After 
two years of government ownership the company was sold to private investors and it 
continued the jet-engine production along with a small output of cars, about 2,000 
annually. The estimated loss for the government with the Rolls-Royce sale was 
enormous. 
 
The British auto industry had suffered since the 1950s from a high incidence of labor 
disputes. Governmental measures are one of the main reasons behind those disputes. In 
order to try managing consumer’s spending at national level, British government was 
constantly changing the rules on hire/purchase (installment sales) and the purchase tax 
also (the sales tax on consumer goods). These constant changes affected sales in a 
serious way, and made the production schedule a complicated calculation for the auto 
industry, especially in what regards labor force. Unemployment turned to be 
unpredictable because the sudden shifts in production and the increase in the salaries 
only gave more power to the labor unions. They were claiming that the workers should 
earn as much as they can because it no longer should take consideration for a long-term 
or loyalty relationship with their companies. The labor strikes may have had some effect 
on investment decisions and exports, but scholars claim that wrong management 
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decisions in export and marketing probably accounted more to the weakening of the 
British industry163. 
 
The British auto industry in the 1970s was suffering from an output decline, and its size 
was not bigger than it was a decade before. The internal demand for automobiles was 
rising continually and it was met by imports which rose to 30% of the sales in 1973. 
 
8.2 Germany (West Germany)164 
Due to a continued rise and fast pace of its auto production, Germany auto industry’s 
output in 1953 surpassed the prewar production. Exports explain these numbers where 
in 1971, 58% of the production was to exports, having America as a large buyer with a 
share of 38% of those exports. The Volkswagen winning combination in America was 
the reliability, a good network of dealers and repair stations and, the most important: the 
low price of its Beetle model.  
As stated in the last chapter, Volkswagen dominated not only the German market but 
also the export market. It built new factories in Hannover and Emden, and continued to 
be the largest seller in the middle-class sector in Germany, despite the efforts of Opel, 
DKW and Fiat.  In 1961 Volkswagen was producing about 5 million cars per year and 
in 1963 it was reaching the impressive output number of 10 million cars per year165. 
Opel was beneficiated with large sums of investment made by the General Motors’ 
Headquarters in America, in order to build new facilities and to expand the business in 
Germany. American managers were brought from the United States to operate these 
new facilities and in terms of strategy Opel chose to target the middle market, between 
the Volkswagen models and the Mercedes-Benz ones.  
Comparatively, Ford expanded more slowly than Opel in Germany, mostly because of 
the lack of a European strategy where the factories in Britain, Germany and France were 
producing cars with non interchangeable parts. In 1964 Ford established a new plant in 
Belgium and started to create the Ford of Europe, encompassing the British and German 
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operations in order to bring more integration to the different plants, assembly lines and 
even the car’s models.  
Daimler-Benz dominated the upper range of the German market until the 1970s. The 
upper class niche didn’t had models that fitted in their lifestyle and Mercedes-Benz 
models offered a strong engineering, solidity in the construction and a clear image of 
quality. This allowed Daimler also to invest in exports and the sales rose not only in the 
car models sold to the Americans but also in its trucks and buses. Daimler also 
established its own network of dealers in the United Sates, after a failed attempt to 
deliver the distribution of its Mercedes-Benz cars to local distributors. In 1969 Daimler 
was already selling about 30,000 models to the American market, and the numbers 
continued to rise in the following years166.  
From the smaller automobile producers in Germany, only few remained in this period of 
economic expansion. Two main examples: DKW was absorbed by Auto Union that 
after some years was bought by Volkswagen, and NSU resumed only to the motorcycle 
manufacture and was bought by Auto Union that latter also disappeared. In 1955 the 
BMW Company returned to Munich and after some acquisitions and mergers with 
German-owned companies, BMW moved its production to more conventional cars with 
large engines167.  
By the 1970’s Germany had three volume carmakers – Volkswagen, Opel and Ford168. 
Mercedes-Benz and BMW were targeting the high-price category and Porsche for 
wealthy consumers. In terms of economy, Germany began to slow down from the 
earlier numbers, imported products began to appear on the domestic market, and overall 
costs rose. The exchange rate of the Mark to American Dollar rose 40% from 1969 to 
1973, causing damages to the exports. It made the German cars much more expensive in 
the American market, specially the Beetle model because it lost its competitive price. 
The labor relations on German auto industry went more smoothly than in Britain, Italy 
or France. Industrie Gewerkschaft Metall was a large and very strong union; together 
with the worker participation in the economy decisions, this probably accounts for the 
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absence of severe friction in the German automobile firms, even in the wake of the 
technological changes that caused so many labor difficulties in Britain. 
 
8.3 France169 
In the post war years, Renault continued to lead in terms of output, and nationalization 
had eliminated private stockholders who might have encouraged management decisions 
to favour short-term profits more than long-term strategies.   
After the Communists left the coalition government in France in 1947, the CGT union 
at Renault ended its cooperative attitude toward management and became demanding 
and obstructionist. The Renault had to deal with a new kind of arrangement between 
labor and management, towards a more traditional adversarial relationship. 
Early in the 1957 the French government concerned about a deteriorating balance of 
payments, asked the automobile industry to rapidly increase exports. The Renault 
Company started it effort to ship as many cars as possible to the United States, but like 
the British experience, the cars designed for Europe did not handle the rough American 
usage. A poor investigation and planning, together with weak networks of service and 
dealers had the consequence of making a bad reputation of French cars in the American 
consumers170. Despite the failure in America, in 1962 the West Germany became a large 
importer of  Renault in Europe, but Spain was Renault’s largest European market 
outside France. Renault expanded its models, covering the low-and middle-price range 
and the upper-price range as well. This was due to a large investment made by the 
French government, and as being the only shareholder of the Company it made a public 
issue of shares and received a return in dividends. Other industry companies angrily 
denounced this as an unfair subsidy.  
Peugeot stayed with one model in the middle-range and its strategy was to build a 
reputation of reliability. The company began introducing a new model every five years 
from 1955 on, keeping each one in production for about 10 years. Peugeot was very 
conservative regarding exports seeing it as only a matter of keeping the domestic 
factories busy and bringing some economies of scale. To spread the risk of fluctuations 
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in foreign markets, it shipped cars in small numbers to about 100 countries in the 1950s, 
rather than concentrating on few countries and investing in production plants, car 
dealers and service systems. In the middle-1960s, coinciding with Jean-Pierre Peugeot 
death, the firm decided to move to a multimodel policy and a more rapid expansion. In 
its expansion Peugeot began to cooperate with other French firms, and from 1963 to 
1965 it worked with Citroen on joint purchasing and producing certain parts. After 
suspecting that Citroen wanted to take over Peugeot, the firm ended its relation with 
Citroen and began the same cooperation with Renault establishing a joint factory and 
with Volvo by sharing many of the engine components. By the 1972 the firm had a 
range of five models extending from the low-and middle-price range and became the 
sixth largest producer in Western Europe.  
The Citroen expanded by taking over Panhard&Levassor in stages, and in 1968 the 
sports and luxury car Maseratti of Modena171. In that same year François Michelin 
committed Citroen to a major change, the company’s sales and earnings had slipped 
because of the strong competition from Renault. François Michelin and Gianni Agnelli 
of Fiat agreed to have Citroen and Fiat to coordinate their activities to better compete on 
the European market against General Motors and Ford. The plan was that Fiat would 
invest funds in the Citroen operations and probably it would soon take over Citroen. 
President Charles de Gaulle refused to permit such step, but the companies did work 
together for some years, although the sums involved were less than the planned ones. In 
1973 the cooperation ended because Fiat didn’t find the Citroen’s people cooperative 
anymore and thus decided the rupture, selling the Citroen´s shares again to the Michelin 
family. Despite the sale Citroen still needed a financial recovery especially because of 
the first oil shock, and in 1974 Peugeot agreed to take over Citroen while Renault took 
over Berliet. The French government gave large loans to these mergers in an attempt to 




                                                           
171 Corlin, Georges (1985) ; p470. 
172 Holmes, P. and Smith, A. (1995), p23. 
Eduardo Gaspar Silva  Universidade Católica Portuguesa 
Master in European Studies – Instituto de Estudos Europeus  Page 62 
8.4 Italy 
Fiat continued its prewar efforts to export to the rest of Europe, and it revived its 
operations in Germany (NSU/Fiat); in France with Simca; in Spain with a new company 
in Barcelona (Seat, with 51% owned by Fiat173), in Austria and in many Latin American 
countries. Fiat also expanded its production of trucks, aircrafts and ships. In 1965 it 
produced 1million cars for the first time. Fiat also signed an agreement with authorities 
in the Soviet Union to build and equip a very large automobile plant at Tolyattigrad174. 
Most of the plant’s machinery was imported from Western Europe and America, and a 
large share of it was financed by Italian government. The Soviet agreement was 
followed by others in which Fiat equipped smaller factories in Eastern Europe to make 
version of Fiat cars in Poland, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Romania.  
Fiat had no difficulties in the domestic market as Alfa Romeo and Lancia were bought 
by Fiat in the middle 1960s. The labor problems of 1969-70 had the consequences of 
changing the Fiat’s strategy. Fiat decided to reduce the amount of semi-skilled labor in 
its factories by introducing more automation and robots. Imports were the only concern, 
as they rose 21% in 1966 and 34% in 1970 – although imports cut Fiat’s share of 
domestic market, Fiat remained a powerful firm by leading Europe’s automobile 
industrial production in 1972 and 1973175. 
 
 
9. The period between 1970 and 1990 
Seven major firms dominated the European mass-market for cars in the early 1970’s: 
Volkswagen, Fiat, Renault, Peugeot-Citroen and British Leyland, along with the United 
States multinationals General Motors and Ford176. They faced an unprecedented fact: to 
share a market that was not growing as fast as the 1960s, and through the 1970s and 
1980s the American multinationals and Japanese imports would gain market share.  
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9.1 Britain  
Although every major European-owned volume car producers went through a 
complicated period in the late 1970s or the 1980s, all emerged to larger profits by the 
late 1980s, except British Leyland. The British government always guaranteed the 
necessary loans to British Leyland, and when the period of crises became a reality, the 
government subsidized with very large sums the modernization of British Leyland. 
These investments had little effect in the firm’s sales and nationalization started to be 
discussed177. The alternative was to accept the unemployment of almost 1million 
workers and the closure of an important firm in the British industry. The government 
decided in 1975 to nationalize the company and changed its name to BL. 
Nationalization did not bring the desired outcomes and BL was still weak in terms of 
financial results, despite the continued efforts (through subsidies) of the British 
government. 
At the time, one of the Thatcher government policies was to sell public companies to 
the private sector, where they believed they would be more efficiently operated178. The 
once successful British Leyland truck division was set up in a joint venture with the 
Dutch truck maker DAF in 1987, after the government cancelled its debts. During its 14 
years of British Leyland ownership, the British government paid a total of 5.4 billion 
dollars in subsidies, BL adopted a new name, Rover Group in 1986 and the Thatcher 
government finally sold it to the British Aerospace in 1989 for 280million dollars after 
paying another 1.5billion dollar in Rover’s debts. The European Economic Commission 
sued the transaction with British Aerospace179 as involving unfair subsidies, so the 
government had to reduce them by several hundred million dollars180. 
In 1990 Honda and Rover came closer, with the Japanese firm becoming 20% owner of 
Rover and 20% of Honda in Britain going to Rover. Great Britain in the early 1990s 
was the major portal through which the Japanese car makers entered Europe and thus 
the European Community181. This is one example how the British car industry by the 
1990s had become largely foreign owned and controlled. Weak management from the 
                                                           
177 Boschma, Ron A. (2007); p214.  
178 Woolock, S. and Wallace, H. (1995), p87. 
179 British Aerospace had been another nationalized concern for the British Government, but after its 
privatization in 1981 it had prospered progressively. 
180 Lopes Porto, Manuel (2001), p280. 
181 Grant, W. (1992); p60. 
Eduardo Gaspar Silva  Universidade Católica Portuguesa 
Master in European Studies – Instituto de Estudos Europeus  Page 64 
1930s on could explain this. Its failures were in many aspects: poor recruitment and 
training of engineers and other management personnel, a very low level of effective 
investment, amateurish foreign marketing and inability to manage the firms182. 
 
9.2 The American automobile producers in Europe183 
The most international of the major producers in Europe were General Motors and Ford, 
with important production facilities in Germany and Britain. Chrysler tried to follow 
this path in Europe in the 1960s when the market was growing much faster than it was 
in America. But Chrysler’s operations did not went as expected and just six months 
after the British Government had bailed out British Leyland and nationalized it, in 
November 1975 Chrysler (that was based in Britain) announced that either the British 
Government had to take over the company or it would be closed184. Fearful of the job 
losses (around 25,000) the government urged a solution – subsidies and loans in the 
amount of 300million dollars. Nevertheless, sales continued to drop and Chrysler sold 
the entire European holding to Peugeot in 1978.  
Ford expanded in Europe in the 1970s, and Spain was the main target because it had one 
of the most rapidly growing markets despite Franco’s regime strict legislations (no 
foreign firm could own over half of Spanish company, local content had to amount to 
95% of a car’s value and there was a 30% tariff on imported parts). Ford tried for 
several years to negotiate its entry and to put aside the tight regulations, in order to 
establish a base in Spain before it joined the Common Market. The Spanish government 
and Ford managed a compromise putting away the complex restrictions that existed for 
foreign companies (the negotiation managed to maintain 100% of the ownership to Ford 
through its Spanish subsidiary, its cars would have 66% domestic content and the tariff 
on imported parts would be 5%). 
In the 1970s the center of Ford design and development of cars shifted to Germany, 
where it had more well-trained engineers. At the same time productivity in Ford’s 
English factories declined, while in Germany it rose. The many labor disputes in the 
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English plants were some of the causes. Nevertheless, Ford didn’t give up on 
manufacturing in Britain and with substantial government subsidy it began building a 
new plant in South Wales. In the 1980s productivity began to rise in Ford’s British 
factories, when workers and managers put aside their mutual distrust and set up joint 
committees to solve problems. 
General Motors revised its European strategy in 1979. All Vauxhall cars in Britain were 
Opel, with the Vauxhall badge on them, fully built up in Germany, Belgium or Spain; or 
assembled in England. General Motors also expanded its marketing effort in Spain and 
France. When Eastern Europe opened to Western firms, General Motors moved 
aggressively while Ford held back. General Motors’ sales were climbing in Germany, 
where Opel was challenging Volkswagen for leadership. GM needed more 
manufacturing capacity and decided to move to Eastern Europe185 (Hungary and 
Poland) where it might lead to increasing sales. These assembly plants began operating 
three shifts a day to meet the demand for cars. 
 
9.3 Italy 
Problems abounded for Fiat in the 1970s. Sales fell as fuel prices rose, efforts at even 
more diversification did not appear to be successful, foreign investment had not paid off 
and labor problems did not improve despite large concessions on payment issues. In 
order to sustain the firm, in 1976 Fiat announced a deal186 with Libyan Muammar 
Qaddafi to sell him 15% of Fiat’s equity much above the market price for these shares 
and Qaddafi would receive representation on Fiat’s board of directors187. Fiat also 
changed its board of directors and with a new management Fiat rebounded in the 1980s 
with new models, improving productivity and quality. The company started to generate 
profits, while it withdrew from the American car market and gave up its investments in 
the Spanish company Seat in 1980.  When the Italian government tried to sell Alfa 
Romeo to Ford, Fiat reacted strongly. Although Fiat’s bid was lower than Ford’s one 
(especially because it provided for Fiat the payment only in 1993) the government had 
no real option. Italian consumers probably would benefit from a strong domestic 
                                                           
185 Baxter, William P. (1973); p260. 
186 Schulze, Reinhard (2000); p192. 
187 Due to the terrorist and mafia problems that were threaten Fiat itself, Gianni Agnelli years later 
regretted and subsequently reversed this step. 
Eduardo Gaspar Silva  Universidade Católica Portuguesa 
Master in European Studies – Instituto de Estudos Europeus  Page 66 
competitor to Fiat, but in the Common Market Fiat already was facing vigorous 
competition in Italy. Fiat took over Alfa Romeo in 1986 but the European Economic 
Commission concluded that a large subsidy the Italian government paid to Alfa Romeo 
before the takeover violated fair competition in the Common Market and that Fiat had 
to pay it back188.  
From the late 1970s to the late 1980s Fiat’s overall labor productivity in cars almost 
doubled. It managed to become both a volume and a specialist car maker, with the Alfa 
Romeo brand for sporty cars and Lancia for luxury, like Volkswagen with its Audi 
brand.  
9.4 Germany 
Volkswagen gradually phased out its Beetle model in the 1970s. It competitive situation 
in the United States crumbled, while Toyota and Nissan alone increased their American 
sales by almost exactly the number that Volkswagen lost.  
Volkswagen operations in Brazil were troubled by that government’s financial 
mismanagement and in 1986 Volkswagen and Ford merged their operations in Brazil 
and Argentina into a joint venture called Autolatina. Production and sales were strong, 
but financial results were still weak due to the corruption complications in those 
countries. Volkswagen also took over the Seat Company in Spain. The Spanish 
government desperate to load Seat, paid off Seat’s 1.7billion dollars debt and promised 
to invest 500million dollars more and pay the pensions for 4,500 surplus workers in 
return for Volkswagen taking control and investing another 500million dollars189.  
At the domestic market Volkswagen maintained production and leadership in Germany 
but suffered problems in the early 1980s190. Volkswagen gained a little more freedom of 
action in 1988 when the federal government of Germany sold its remaining 16% stock 
to the public, having more flexibility in moving manufacturing operations outside 
Germany and discharging surplus labor.  
                                                           
188 Based on what John Vickers could summarize when stated that “The Treaty has a basic principle that 
state aid which distorts or threatens to distort competition will be incompatible with the common market”, 
quoted by Rodrigues, Eduardo L. (2008), p242. 
189 Dancet, G and Rosenstock M. (1995), p13. 
190 Kugler, Anita (1987), p278. 
Eduardo Gaspar Silva  Universidade Católica Portuguesa 
Master in European Studies – Instituto de Estudos Europeus  Page 67 
Volkswagen expansion investments included new dealers in Czechoslovakia, a new 
plant in Spain, a joint venture with Ford in Portugal191, an assembly plant in Changchun 
in China and also in Mexico. Although Japanese cars were taking 15% of the West 
Germany market by the middle 1980s, Volkswagen was willing to work with Japanese 
firms. It licensed Nissan to make a Volkswagen model for sale in Japan and arranged to 
make Toyota pickup trucks in Germany with a domestic content of 50%192.  
Daimler-Benz quality engineering and manufacturing along with good marketing and 
service, won its strong reputation throughout the world. In Europe, its best export 
markets were large countries, including Spain. Japan also emerged as volume buyer of 
Mercedes-Benz cars in 1989. Nevertheless, Daimler-Benz primary importance was 
trucks and buses (it was already leader in diesel technology) where it became the world 
leader as tariff barriers fell. Daimler-Benz also decided to diversify into other areas in 
the 1980s, acquiring the equipment firm AEG, the jet-engine maker MTU and the 
aircraft manufacturer Dornier. In 1990 it reached an open-ended agreement with the 
Japanese conglomerate Mitsubishi to cooperate closely on industrial activities.  
The BMW firm began to grow rapidly in the 1970s selling largely in Germany first, 
then to the rest of Europe and Unites States. In the late 1980s 40% of BMW’s output 
was sold in the domestic market, a similar share in Europe (outside Germany) and 
around 15% in the United States. Offering quality at high prices like Mercedes-Benz, it 
found there was room for both companies.  
 
9.5 France 
Renault sell well in the 1970s as it had several, fuel-efficient models. Despite this, in the 
increasingly competitive market of the 1980s, Renault began to have problems in 
Europe. To maintain its market share in cars, it had to cut prices. Labor costs could not 
be cut, as labor began to be an obstacle after Socialist François Mitterrand was elected 
President in 1981 and installed a Socialist cabinet with Communist participation. The 
results were large deficits in Renault that put its management in risk when Mitterrand 
regime changed its policy from traditional socialist nationalization and welfare toward a 
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more freedom of enterprise193. Renault’s president had to resign in favor of Georges 
Bess, a tough businessman that in two years made Renault return to profitability but lost 
important market share in Europe. In 1987 the government decided to convert Renault 
from a régie to an ordinary stock corporation, with the government holding all the 
shares. The major obstacle was the large debt Renault owned to state banks, about 
2billion dollars. The government proposed to cancel this debt (which would amount to a 
subsidy194) and in return cut production capacity in the assembly plants. After long 
negotiations, the European Economic Commission and the French parliament agreed to 
change Renault’s legal status195.  
France’s other major firm Peugeot, grew to world importance after its Citroen 
acquisition and in 1977 with the acquisition of Chrysler European operations. Despite 
its size, Peugeot did not have small cars to meet the shift in the market in the 1980s after 
the second oil shock, so its sales drop severely. This required temporary lay-offs and 
vigorous efforts to make permanent employment reductions196. The output hit the 
lowest figures in 1984, but in that year Peugeot began to revive financially, at the same 
time Renault was in its most difficult years.  
For decades Peugeot cars sold very well in Africa, but Japanese competition intensified 
there. Several times Peugeot launched market attacks in the United States but failed to 
take many sales from the Japanese or other European automakers. As 1980s ended, six 
volume car producers remained in Western Europe197. All had become profitable again 
after the difficult restructurings forced by the end of the market’s long expansion. The 
increasing competition had required them to shed labor and plants, introduce more 
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10. Conclusions of the Automobile History in Europe 
Some historians characterize the period from 1948 to 1973 as being “La Deuxiéme 
Belle Époque” because the average growing rate of the European economies was 
4.9%198. The European automobile industry had an historical growth from 1950 until 
the first oil-price shock in 1973. Taking into account the production figures of Britain, 
France, Germany and Italy (the biggest European auto makers), the total output rose 
from 1.57 million in 1950 to 11.67 million in 1970.  
The growth in the auto industry followed the path of Western Europe’s postwar 
economic expansion, where the auto companies continued their investment in small and 
cheap cars. Although, as soon as European personal incomes started to rise 
continually199, the small and cheap cars were slowly changing to larger and powerful 
vehicles, in order to respond to the new generation’s demands. Regarding exports, the 
automotive sector was again selling vehicles to North and South America, Africa, Asia 
and within Europe when in the 1958 the European Economic Community began to 
function and the customs barriers began to shrink. Before, the tariffs on imported cars 
ranged from 17% on West Germany to 45% on Italy but after the European Economic 
Community these restrictions began gradually to fall, and a common external tariff of 
17.6% was introduced in order to protect the internal markets.  
From the consumer’s point of view, it was better since the competition in prices made 
the cars cheaper and improved technology and reliability. From the industrial’s point of 
view, they benefited from the new markets that were open and also the advantage of 
economies of scale. With tariffs and other restrictions limited or eliminated among the 
West European states by the 1970s, a multinational could move some aspects of 
automobile manufacturing among its plants in several countries to take advantage of 
currency exchange rates, labor costs, and productivity. However, that was not a reality 
because of the heavy expenses and disputes from lay off workers, and also by the need 
of keeping costly machinery operating. 
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Chart 10 - European Automobile Production 1950-1973 (in millions) 
 
1950 1954 1958 1962 1966 1970 1973 
Britain 0.784 1.038 1.369 1.689 2.053 2.098 2.164 
France 0.357 0.600 1.128 1.537 2.024 2.750 3.596 
Germany 0.300 0.674 1.488 2.343 3.035 3.842 3.943 
Italy 0.129 0.217 0.403 0.947 1.366 1.854 1.958 
 
Source: McLaughlin, A. and Maloney, W. (1999) p56. 
 
The oil shock of 1973-74 was the final mark in the great boom of the European 
automobile industry.  The petroleum prices went high and both in Europe and United 
States the governments tried to reduce consumption with various rationing schemes. 
The oil shock affected the demand for cars worldwide, not only the larger and less fuel-
efficient models but also the small and economic ones, increasing the demand for diesel 
engines by the mid-1974. 
Another effect was the restructuring of the automobile industry in the United States, 
where the producers shifted their production to small cars. Under federal government 
pressure (and incentives) gradually the American cars reduced their size, weight and 
fuel consumption. This led to efforts by the three major producers to design mass-
market cars that with little alteration would suit not only the American market but also 
the European one. The “globalized car” became an objective, with components mass 
produced by specialized factories in several countries brought together for assembly in 
one or more plants, and then the cars sold all over the world.  
Many American car models by the late 1970s resemble typical European and Japanese 
cars, and the Japanese took advantage of it more than the European producers. In the 
United States, the Japanese cars earned a higher reputation for reliability than the 
European ones and only Volkswagen managed to compete with the Japanese. 
Nevertheless Japan kept its dominance over the automobile import trade to the United 
States.  
Following the Iranian revolution that replaced the shah by Khomeini in 1979, came the 
second oil shock. It reduced the demand for cars again, and the auto-makers continued 
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their efforts to survive to this sharp decrease. European automakers also had to 
overcome situations in labor and manufacturing methods: electronics, where the 
Japanese often were leaders. Electronics technology involved computer-aided design for 
cars, helped management schedule deliveries and processes, and it changed production 
itself – computer controlled machines (robots) could do certain complex or unhealthy 
jobs during assembly. The technology allowed that semi-skilled workers no longer had 
to do unpleasant tasks and provided greater flexibility in production. However, there 
was a negative side: sometimes the malfunction of the machines and the complaints 
from labor forces regarding the human jobs losses200. 
In terms of management, the European automobile producers followed the American 
path and instead of building huge car factories like the Soviet Union, they decentralized 
to several assembly plants, supplied by a number of specialized parts and subassembly 
factories. This system allowed building cheaper cars, because subcontracting means that 
auto companies didn’t have to invest in new factories and depended on close inspection 
to ensure quality.  
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Chapter III - The European integration process and the Automobile Industry 
1. The automobile industry at European level 
A decade after the Second World War, the European economy was growing, the general 
production output was rapidly getting ahead of the prewar levels, and the development 
gap to the United Stated was shrinking201. The world had seen the birth of many 
institutions like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the GATT and also 
the European Community of Coal and Steel202. Of course, much of the developments in 
Europe after the war would not be possible without the aid of the Marshall Plan. The 
following developments led to a series of political and economic organizations in 
Europe and also to Treaties that founded the European Economic Community and to the 
European Free Trade Association.  
 
Regarding the automobile industry, the first supranational organization in Europe was 
the Organization of International Automobile Constructors (OICA) established in 1955 
in Paris. This organization was formed to lobby the European Commission. The OICA 
at the time was an important source for ideas for the Commission. In 1958 a satellite 
group of OICA was created, the Liaison Committee of the Automobile Industry of the 
Countries of European Communities (CLCA) in order to represent the national 
automobile trade associations.  
In 1972 another group was formed, the Committee of Common Market Automobile 
Constructors (CCMC), and soon became the industry’s most prestigious group. The 
group was formed to fulfill the lack of direct company representation at CLCA, and at 
the beginning of the 70s the Commission started to draw plans to regulate a number of 
technical areas, and the European companies were worried that Ford and General 
Motors would lobby for the adoption of the United States regulations.  
In the middle 80s the two groups worked closely together to monitor the relevant policy 
agendas. The CCMC tended to concentrate on technical issues and CLCA became the 
dominant group in terms of legal and fiscal matters. However, the political development 
in Europe after 1986 placed the working relationship between the two groups under 
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pressure. Both group’s areas of expertise became blurred as policy-making activity 
increased.  The Commission was expressing concern about the sector’s inability to act 
collectively, perceiving that both group’s internal decision-making structures did not 
adjust to changing circumstances. At the beginning of 1990, the tension between the 
CCMC and the CLCA had reached a point where several important companies began to 
argue for the creation of a single European federation.  
Up to the late 1980s the automobile industry was regularly beset by financial crises and 
suffered from poor industrial relations. Because automobile production was so 
important to the manufacturing sector, governments often felt compelled to intervene. In 
many aspects the European industry was dominated by “national champions”203 heavily 
reliant on domestic sales. Therefore, issues like technical harmonization and state aid 
have all become matters of high politics for the national government, and the use of 
national strategies by companies and groups was an attractive option. That was in line 
with the increasing importance of the Council of Ministers in the decision-making 
process, and the nation-state bargaining character of much of EEC policy-making. 
While the Single European Act sought to redress this by limiting the powers of veto in 
the Council of Ministers, the majority needed for a decision remained high and national 
channels have figured prominently in the automobile corporate representation strategies. 
Council decisions were reached through a complex process of bargaining and trade-offs 
between member states. Therefore, a key decision could reflect how well a national 
minister had mastered the national briefings. Companies also realized that once a 
Council meeting begins, their position was in the hands of a minister who may have 
competing priorities. Therefore, hostility in the Council through an important lobbying 
was not an adequate substitute for influencing the content of a directive during the 
initial drafting stages in the Commission.  
One of the most significant developments in the automobile sector was the opening of 
Brussels offices by major companies, aiming to develop personal links to policy 
development204. Large firms also hired Brussels-based lawyers to represent company 
interests of local political consultants. While there was an expectation by Commission 
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officials that policy would be channeled through Euro-groups, a company rarely relied 
on the group alone. 
These Brussels offices had the function of monitoring social and political issues likely 
to affect the interests of the business, helping to represent the company key audiences or 
stakeholders, and guiding top managers in their policy-making205. Also companies with 
established Brussels offices felt they had some inside advantage, for example, due to the 
long-term relationship they have with key individuals or by virtue of leverage due to 
specific expertise or national importance206. Good contacts were essential if companies 
wanted to acquire advance intelligence of developments affecting their business. Even 
German companies accustomed to work with authoritative central trade groups at 
national level, have undertaken independent activity at European level.   
The Commission appeared to welcome Companies contacts despite its wish to work 
with Euro-groups. This happened in 1990 when negotiations between CCMC and the 
Commission over the issue of Japanese cars in Europe broke down. Faced with this 
problem the Commission then entered into formal bilateral dealings with the six largest 
European-owned manufacturers (Peugeot, Citroen, Renault, Fiat, Volkswagen and 
Seat). The complexity of this issue illustrated the “policy mess” which can emerge 
when the consultation process extends beyond Euro-groups to bilateral contacts. That is 
why the Commission generally prefers to consult through Euro-groups, although in 
some cases (as the Japanese Car’s issue showed) where the Commission is skeptical of 
a group view, it will often test that position by seeking the opinions of individual 
Companies. By having pan-European operations, these Companies have experience of 
operating in a number of EEC member states, which could provide cross-national 
information that can be utilized by the Commission.  
Led by the frustration of the Japanese Car issue, by the summer of 1990 the 
Commission began to put pressure on the automobile sector in order to develop a more 
cohesive collective voice. The Commission was determined to replace national import 
barriers with a European trade policy. In 1990, twelve members of CCMC resigned 
from the group and announced they would no longer being supporting CLCA either. 
Throughout 1990 negotiations took place between CCMC and CLCA over the need to 
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create a single group.  In 1991, the industry agreed upon the statutes for a new unified 
group, the Association des Constructeurs Européens d’Automobiles (ACEA). The new 
group’s structure differed from its predecessors in two important aspects: it extended its 
membership to include the American and Swedish manufacturers, and adopted a system 
of majority voting207.  
The national trade associations were put aside within the group structure. These groups 
were represented by one standing committee, with no voting power, no representation 
on the board of directors and could only participate in working groups and strategy 
groups if invited by the secretariat. The key manufacturing companies could directly 
finance the Euro-group activities and control its policy-making mechanisms. Like other 
sectors, this was prompted by active large companies, aiming to form small Euro-
groups through which companies could advance their interests208.   
 
2. The ACEA/Commission relationship 
The Commission’s policy-making in the automobile sector was mainly in four broad 
areas209:  
1 - The internal market, including all aspects of competition policy relating to state aid 
and vehicle distribution, the harmonization of the vehicle taxes, improvement of vehicle 
safety, and promotion of environmental standards. 
2- European Union policy in the field of structural interventions and human resources, 
including all EEC policy programs used to facilitate economic adjustments in the sector, 
such as regional policies and support for training and infrastructure.   
3 – Research and technological development; all horizontally organized funding 
programs incorporated in the EEC’s framework programs.  
4 – External trade policy, including monitoring the gradual opening of the EEC market 
to Japanese car imports and improving market access to third markets for European 
automobile companies210. 
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From ACEA’s standpoint, the essential task of interest representation was to ensure that 
once sectoral priorities had been defined in working groups, all parties united to a 
common line in any separate dealings, with the Commission and with national 
governments. The internal decision-making structure of ACEA was also designed to 
reflect the decision-making structures of the EEC as a whole.  
One of the ACEA most important campaigns in 1990s was proposing changes to the 
industry selective distribution system. All major automobile companies were selling and 
servicing their vehicles through a network of authorized car dealers. Each dealer had a 
clear defined territory within which the dealer had exclusive rights to sell the 
manufacturer’s products. In return for exclusivity, the dealer signed a contract with the 
manufacturer to retail the vehicles and provide all servicing to the vehicles. This system 
was incongruously with EEC competition laws since it denied consumers the chance of 
comparing a range of brands at any one dealership, and restricted competition in the 
after-sales market211.  
The effort to create and empower ACEA was not to create a collective voice that would 
displace other forms of political representation, rather, it was designed to rectify a 
weakness in an important area of corporative representation. Thus, the strengthening of 
the Euro-group took place alongside with efforts to improve “own account” operations 
in Brussels. This happened because the positions a company may favor were not always 
in areas where there would be a collective interest among the members, and thus cannot 
be advanced via Euro-group. However, the group was an important option and one that 
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3. State aids213 
In terms of competition policy, throughout the years the governments always found 
ways to overcome the limits that ironically themselves agreed to establish. Thus, the 
competition policy assumes a bigger importance when applied to a competitive 
geography, composed by many sovereign governments, as it is the case of the European 
Union214. The granting of aid was a well-established policy instrument in many nation 
states and the Commission focused its efforts on control rather than eradication in the 
first instance.  
The 1980-6 period can be described as being problematical in terms of attitude from the 
Commission, where many authors consider that its main objectives were frustrated. The 
recession throughout Europe in the 1970s led to a further round of subsidies for 
automobile companies. As seen in the previous chapter, British Leyland was asking the 
government in 1980 a further £1bilion of aid to prevent large-scale closures. In Sweden, 
Volvo followed a similar route, and in Italy both Fiat and Alfa Romeo were undergoing 
state-funded restructuring programs. Between 1977 and 1987, member states granted 
state aid of an estimated amount of ECU 26 billion to motor vehicle producers215. The 
Commission increased its efforts to monitor such programs but the situation was 
difficult to control.  
The main problem was that aid granted for purposes that appeared to satisfy the 
exemption criteria216 was in fact being used for general purposes, which the company 
concerned would have had to finance itself anyway. Such behavior constituted a 
distortion of trade217.  The Commission emphasized its determination to monitor the 
automobile sector in 1983 when it reminded several member states their obligation to 
notify state aids. It also made known its displeasure about the practice of paying illegal 
aids to companies before the Commission had the opportunity to investigate. The new 
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monitoring system was to apply to all aid granted, and the Commission tried to persuade 
member states to adopt its proposals, although the system depended in large measure on 
goodwill and there was scope for abuse. After this attempt had failed, the Commission 
dropped its plans for greater monitoring by the end of 1983 and continued to rely on 
general competition rules in individual cases, and no negative decisions were taken by 
the Commission, despite the scope of action provided by the Article 93 (2) of the CE 
Treaty218. 
The principal feature of the period lasting from the mid-1970s into the 1980s is that 
precisely in this period, one of political stagnation and decisional malaise, took place an 
important, but less visible mutation – the erosion of the limits of the Community 
competences219. The Commission emerged from this first period somehow disappointed 
at its failure in the automobile sector, but determined to deal more effectively with state 
aids issues. In the period of 1986-7 it launched investigations into preferential loans 
granted to Peugeot and Renault by the French government, into the German government 
plans to partly fund a new Daimler-Benz factory in Baden-Württemberg, and into 
injections of new capital in Alfa Romeo, Renault and Seat by their governments. These 
cases raised further concerns about trade distortion and competitive advantage. The 
industry itself remained silent as one manufacturer after other received aid, applying the 
mentality of “a dog doesn’t eat a dog”220. Even though many Commission investigations 
at the time demonstrated that some aid was illegal and represented a market distortion, it 
remains the case that no member of the ACEA has ever objected to aid granted to 
another member. Only once, the Commission received an objection to aid granted, and 
that was when the French aerospace group Matra, complained about the Portuguese 
government aid given to Ford and Volkswagen to develop and build a multi-purpose 
vehicle with the Autoeuropa project221.  
The three major state aids investigations in this period, involving Alfa Romeo, Renault 
and Rover Group had many similarities. The companies concerned were rapidly losing 
market share, some had negative cash flows, and debt relief was granted by national 
governments. The member states were learning how to undercover these subsidies and, 
in all cases, the aid was designed to prepare the companies for privatization. This time 
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there was a clear pattern in the way the Commission dealt with those companies. In each 
case the only part of the aid that was approved from the Commission were those linked 
to specific capacity closures. Perhaps most important of all was that for the first time the 
aid was approved upon fulfillment of a number of implementation conditions. This was 
clearly a measure of the Commission’s growing authority in the area.  
By the end of the 1980s the Commission was developing a specific framework to 
monitor the aid to the sector. This substantial change was due to the experiences and 
reactions to the three major state aids investigations in this period222. In addition, the 
Commission used this period of structural adjustment and shift in the sector to persuade 
a majority of member states regarding a new approach to the state aids monitoring.  
 
3.1 The state aid framework and its implementation 
In 1988, the Commission published a memorandum223 which set out a policy state aid 
framework for the sector. It referred that despite the substantial restructuring of the 
“national champions” in the 1980s, the industry still lacked international 
competitiveness. The Commission decided to intervene more directly to accelerate the 
restructuring process in the sector. The approaching single market deadline in 1992 and 
the increasing globalization of automobile production provided the ideal leitmotiv for a 
more assertive approach from the Commission. The memorandum also claimed for 
more effective regulation of aid, and received the support of the Council of Ministers 
and the European Parliament.  
Many in the Commission associated the automobile “national champions” with much 
that was wrong with the European economy. “National champions” were associated 
with inefficiency, seen as retarding restructuring efforts, and, had become dependent on 
subsidies from their national governments. In reality, they often captured the domestic 
market and became complacent about international markets. Not only did their market 
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power afford them protection, it also made difficult to refuse their regular demands for 
state subsidy224.  
The Commission completed a draft framework by the end of 1988 with important 
changes. With this new framework, any aid over ECU 17million required previous 
notification, and any aid given to the industry under horizontal schemes (even if it had 
received general approval from the Commission) would require notification. The new 
guidelines required member states to provide annual report containing the details of all 
aid payments to automotive companies. The spirit of the new rules was to “allow the 
Commission to verify more directly the compatibility of the aid in the sector with the 
competition rules of the Treaty”225. 
It is important to underline that the 1989 framework was not intended to remove all aid, 
but to control both its flow and its range of purposes. The Commission considered 57 
cases under the new guidelines, between 1989 and 1996, and only two of them were 
incompatible with the framework226. Probably a good measure of the success of this 
framework is that during the early 1990s, when European sector experienced one of the 
worst recession, the industry collectively received less aid than Renault alone had 
received in the 1980s.  
The competition policy followed by the Commission was different from its very 
beginning, because it had the instrumental capacity of a goal that few believed: the unity 
of the European Market227. Thus, in terms of state aids it is possible to verify that the 
Commission in the automobile sector managed to break long-standing relationships 
between governments and industries, which were encouraged by shared attitudes and 
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4. The External Policy – trade policy 
European governments were concerned by Japanese car advances in European domestic 
market share in the 1970s and those with national production bases to protect responded 
with some form of market closure229. In 1971 Britain imported 12,995 Japanese cars, 
representing 1% of the total market; by 1975 the figure was 107,934, or 9% of the 
market. At this time the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders (SMMT) failed in 
its attempts to persuade the British government to impose anti-dumping duties on the 
Japanese. The British government instead encouraged SMMT to seek a voluntary 
agreement on moderation with Japanese Automobile Manufacturer Association 
(JAMA). However, it did take the intervention of the British government to bring the 
Japanese side to the negotiation table. Thereafter, a Voluntary Export Restraint (VER) 
was implemented through annual negotiations between SMMT and JAMA230.  
Increasing Japanese import penetration met a similar response in other European 
countries. The French government contemplated imposing a formal quota in 1977 but 
decided instead that a VER would operate once Japanese companies had achieved a 3% 
market share. This occurred in 1980 and accordingly the 3% ceiling was 
implemented231.In Spain, a unilateral quota limited Japanese imports to just 12,000 
units. Germany and Benelux countries, who had made a virtue of their openness, flirted 
with informal agreements throughout the 1970s and 1980s. In the 1980s Japanese 
market share in Germany floated between 15% and 16%. While there was no formal 
agreement in place, Japanese side was attentive of the need to restraint. Italy had a 
bilateral trade agreement with Japan dating back to 1952, limiting the flow of finished 
products in both directions, and Japanese share of Italian market stayed below 1% 
through the post-war period. Since 1981 the Commission had been monitoring Japanese 
imports, with member states informing the Commission of the number and value of 
Japanese automotive imports in their national markets.  
The European Economic Community (EEC), as it then was, took the decision in 1985 to 
create a Single European Market (SEM)232. It was an opportunity for the Commission to 
claim its authority on the region and announce its arrival as an international trading 
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partner. The Commission was determined to press ahead with the SEM program and to 
undertake harmonization in the automotive sector as a key integrative step. This was a 
sector where national policy paths were long established and where protection of the 
national market through quotas and technical specifications was accepted as legitimate 
objective.  
The CE automotive trade policy was for a long time dominated by the issue of trade 
with Japan in terms of both trade flows and market access. The elimination of national 
imports restrictions on Japanese cars was one of the most controversial aspects of the 
single market in automobiles, although the Commission followed the Montesquieu 
thesis that commerce between nations leads to independence and by so it leads to 
peace233. In the 1970s and 1980s the use of VER and import tariffs to limit the free flow 
of finished vehicles from Japan was viewed as a legitimate policy instrument. There had 
been little evidence to suggest that protectionism had enabled national industries to 
acquire the requisite competitiveness to match the Japanese234. However, in 1988 the 
European Commission announced its intention to develop a European automotive trade 
policy, and it stated that would do all efforts to harmonize national trade policies in this 
highly sensitive area.  
The requirement that all member states remove restrictions on the movement of good 
within the CE after 1992 weakened the existing informal agreements that were 
protecting some national markets from Japanese imports. After 1992, Japanese cars 
could enter the EEC via an unprotected national market (Britain) and then be redirected 
to a heavily protected market (Single European Market). The possibility for disruption 
and the scope of national governments adopting unilateral measures encouraged the 
Commission to act.  
The Commission’s desire to draw a European automotive trade policy was not only an 
important integrative step towards a Single European Market in vehicles, but also as 
symbolic step in Europe’s development as a regional trading bloc and its evolving 
political relationship with Japan. Economic and political union in Europe was partly 
motivated by the rise of Japan as a global economic power235. The Commission was 
making efforts to be the key broker in the future trade relations with Japan and other 
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regions. Thus, the existing bilateral trade agreements between member states and Japan 
(in key markets such as automobiles) had to be eliminated. According to Sandholtz and 
Zysman236, the 1992 project was sustained by the Commission, in order to broker elite 
bargains by adapting the Commission itself to changes in the international environment 
and exploiting diversity in the domestic political context. The 1992 project emerged 
because the institutions of the European communities, especially the Commission, were 
finally able to exercise effective policy leadership. The international structural changes 
and a favorable domestic setting provided the opportunity for restarting the 
Communities. The Commission played the role of policy entrepreneur.  
The requirement to harmonize policy towards Japan in this sector cut across entrenched 
national interest. Consequently, it would require the dismantling of valued policy 
instruments at national level. This doesn’t mean that all the Commission’s views 
prevailed in all outcomes237. Policy towards Japan was achieved as a result of European 
car producers reaching a common position through ACEA and by its turn, from ACEA 
negotiating with the Commission238.  Indeed, interested member states and many 
automobile producers gained significant concessions in the negotiating process. The 
details of the policy were blocked in consultation with the various interests. On many 
issues the coalition of member states and powerful automobile companies was a 
powerful and influential one, so in the end it was achieved an Element of Consensus239. 
With this Element of Consensus, the Commission has gained assurances that the market 
could be completely open after 1999, that protected markets would gradually open, and 
that Japanese market share would increase over the next years. As Bangemann240 
remembered the GATT agreement was also taken into account in this Element of 
Consensus: it was not merely to encourage free trade, it was also backed up politically. 
In this respect, there was not a realistic alternative to the method of Japanese self-
limitation chosen by the Committee even if this intermediate measure was not entirely 
satisfactory. That was because, at the end of the transitional period, the GATT rules 
would be fully accepted. In the external policy the Commission can be characterized as 
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a “policy entrepreneur” persuading, and bargaining in pursuit of pragmatic and 
workable policy outcomes241.  
To achieve this delicate consensus, the Commission had to extend branches to several 
national governments in order to keep the negotiations with Japan. The immediate 
effects were that the Commission was pushed away from the policy package it 
originally wanted. However, the SEM represented a unique integrative step and an 
enormous project for the Commission and Europe, and it should have been counter-
productive not to accommodate the various interests in the face of this Japanese threat. 
In what has become a clear trend in Single Market policies, the Element of Consensus’ 
understanding reflected the Commission’s desire to ensure national cooperation in a 
policy development, rather than pursue full integration and the attendant risks of 
disputes with member states242.  
 
5. The Internal Policy 
During the negotiations of the Elements of Consensus, and subsequent to the 
understanding, great emphasis was placed in the Internal Policy that would accompany 
the External Policy. There would be a program of support for the automobile sector 
during the period when national trade policies were lifted to smooth the process of 
industrial adjustment. A Council resolution on the sector stated the measures should be 
brought forward to facilitate adjustment. Such measures should be aimed at the 
adjustment of the European motor vehicle industry and should be taken in good time, so 
as properly to accompany the gradual opening of the market. 
 
5.1 The Industrial policy 
Industrial policy is generally seen as an instrument through which governments 
underwrite certain industrial enterprises or sectors because they are believed to be of 
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strategic importance to the economy, usually associated with “national champions”243. 
Thus, industrial policy in the EEC covers a wide range of policies directed at activities 
of firms, including state aid, competition policy, R&D and education and training244. 
The EEC policy for a long time reflected the sum of its parts, and in the sphere of 
industrial policy this created inconsistency of policy instruments. The composition of 
the Commission’s leading personnel was viewed as an important variable to explain its 
orientation to industrial policy245. Commissioners such as Sutherland and Britain have 
pursued aggressively competition-based policies in the face of opposition from member 
states, firms, other Commissioners and even Jacques Delors. On the other hand, Karel 
van Miert seems to have adopted a more flexible approach since his arrival at the 
Commission.  
There was a consensus between the Commission and ACEA over the basic principles of 
EEC industrial policy. While the primary responsibility for industrial restructuring was 
competence of industry itself, ACEA maintained that EEC institutions and EEC 
member states had the responsibility to create an environment that would facilitate and 
encourage the growth of a competitive car industry. The Commission’s approach to 
industrial policy (or as other authors claim to industrial adjustment) has led to tensions 
with leading manufacturers and member states. These have been more noticeable with 
companies such as Peugeot-Citroen, Renault and Fiat who were used to a symbiotic 
relationship with government agencies246. 
 
5.2 Technical Harmonization 
One of the major obstacles to the single market in vehicles was the countless technical 
regulations that existed in national markets. The Cecchini report247  showed that the 
automobile sector was ranking the top of the industrial sectors, being the one with more 
barriers to trade.  
The process of harmonization began in 1970s when the increasing trade flows between 
European national markets and pressure from multinational producers led the 
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Commission to search for common standards and regulations. It was in response to this 
that the industry formed the CLCA and the CCMC. Many issues were dealt in a 
countless number of technical committees under the umbrella of the Motor Vehicle 
Working Group (MVWG), a forum of industry experts made from relevant European 
and national trade groups and companies. The Commission worked closely with 
MVWG which then submitted its proposals to the Committee for Adaptation to 
Technical Progress for Whole Vehicle Type Approval (WVTA).  
The Commission worked on harmonization during the 1970s and 1980s in an effort to 
achieve the full goals of WVTA by 1992, i.e. regulations when approved and certified 
by one national authority would be accepted throughout the CE without further 
examination and approval248. Despite the obvious logic of full technical harmonization 
by the 1992 Single Market deadline, cohesion was difficult to achieve in the EEC-level 
networks, because policy participation in many of those areas considered as “techno-
politics” were often vested with national and corporate interests. If the process of 
technical harmonization in Europe made some progress, then creating a truly WVTA 
would be a long and arduous process249.  
 
5.3 Research and Development 
Negotiations between the automobile sector and the Commission over research and 
development (R&D) have been complicated for many years and reached a difficult 
period250 when negotiating the Element of Consensus with disagreements over the 
policy instruments to fund R&D in the automotive sector and the limited sums of 
available money. 
These disputes within the policy network don’t mean that the industry received little or 
no support through CE R&D Programme. In a sector which is so crucial to the 
manufacturing bases of the regions, its companies have received funding through 
participation in a wide range of programs. These included projects on generic 
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manufacturing via BRITE/EURAM251, the development of computer-assisted 
production processes via ESPRIT, engine combustion programs via JOULE, and the 
development of intelligent safety technologies via DRIVE252.  
By the mid 1990s the key players, ACEA and the Commission, had to put to one side 
their differences and began working on projects towards the Fourth Framework 
Programme. There were several examples of these initiatives, one of them when the 
Commission and ACEA attempted to focus attention and effort on new product design 
through the “Car of Tomorrow” Task Force. The announcement of the Task Force was 
followed by extensive negotiations between the Commission and EUCAR centered in 
the Action Plan253. The Task Force also aimed to facilitate regulatory stability and the 
Commission allocated additional funds to this purpose.   
Despite the critics of the automobile industry regarding R&D, the Commission 
continued to mobilize its resources to make coordinated applications for funding aid 
programs. Putting aside the academic discussion about what constitutes industrial policy 
or not, there was a range of the Commission-supported programs and initiatives aiming 
to raise the international competitiveness of the automobile sector through R&D. These 
efforts may have frustrated the industry’s expectations, but they may represent the limits 
of Commission’s abilities, given the constraints of the overall policy framework. As 
Menon and Hayward observed, “although many firms and some governments 
increasingly see the need for European-level coordination and cooperation in R&D 
activities (…) Community policies are, of necessity, targeted as much with equity of 
distribution as effectiveness in mind”254. 
 
5.4 Production capacity 
In the 1990s Fiat, Ford, General Motors, Peugeot-Citroen, Renault and Volkswagen 
produced almost 80% of the European production. The market share was also evenly 
distributed between these manufacturers. This contrasted with the U.S. where only three 
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national manufacturers of fifteen that existed in 1945 were operating255. Two other 
factors compounded European over-capacity: first Japanese European transplant 
production was fast approaching 1million vehicles in Europe; secondly, imports from 
developing regions (China, India and others) have been on an increasing trend in the 
1990s. The Commission, the governments and the automobile industry all agreed that 
over-capacity was the biggest challenge facing the sector. 
Thus, at a time when the Commission was seeking to reduce capacity in the European 
sector, the progressive liberalization of the European market was bringing new capacity. 
The arrival of new capacity in Europe has led many debates between the Commission 
and ACEA. The existing producers were at disadvantage compared with the Japanese 
plants in Europe which were built with public support, and based on leading-edge 
technology and design. ACEA argued that older factories in Europe need funding to 
facilitate modernization and enable them to become more internationally competitive256.  
This issue was of major concern to ACEA, and pushed the Commission to produce an 
aid package for restructuring during the 1990s negotiations with Japan. It sought 
unsuccessfully to tie the industry’s agreement to a reduction on imports, with additional 
support for European firms to cope with the challenge from transplants. The major task 
was to remove some of the capacity from the European automobile sector by removing 
the weaker, less-efficient producers from the market. The traditional approach from 
national governments to over-capacity has been intervening and try to broker a deal 
between the leading companies. This approach has been followed at various times in all 
European nation states. The spectrum of defensive political interests and pressures was 
emerging around car factories and companies, making the task of removing capacity a 
highly sensitive one257. 
The Commission had neither the political authority258 nor the political will to adopt an 
interventionist approach. Throughout the 1980s the Commission was content to allow 
national governments to run restructuring programs. The difficulty with this approach 
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was that member states often failed to implement the reductions in capacity required259. 
The Commission’s preferred option was to create a policy framework which allowed 
market forces to determine which companies would survive260. Here one can find the 
Ordo-liberalist influence in the European institutions, as Ordo-liberals believed in a true 
market economy from which power is excluded and in which outcomes are the results 
of the voluntary market transactions261. However, it has only been able to assert this 
objective since the introduction of the sectoral state aids framework in 1989. The 
Commission’s effort to combat state aids in the automobile sector was also motivated 
by the fact that most of these subsidies had preserved the weak and in some cases the 
insolvents companies to the detriment of the long-term health in international 
competitiveness of the European economy. Similarly, part of the motivation for 
removing import tariffs on Japanese goods was to expose European producers to 
international competition and accelerate adjustment and rationalization.  
European institutions have dispossessed national governments of many of the 
instruments of selective intervention and replaced them with a non-interventional 
approach. However, closing down automobile firms involved massive job losses, often 
in regions that could not support these effects.  Moreover, achieving capacity reductions 
through mergers and acquisitions was equally difficult. The track record of acquisitions, 
joint ventures and mergers between European companies was not good. The mergers 
that have taken place have generally represented instances where there was a natural fit 
between the companies262. 
In a mature market263 such as the automobile sector, these alliances were quite obvious 
to happen. To find complementary parties was preferable to take-over: it was more 
difficult to integrate a direct competitor into an existing organization. In addition, most 
European producers were in better shape that they were in the 1980s, and this was partly 
because several national governments allocated massive state aid to the sector as 
anticipation to the new restrictions about to be implemented by the Commission.  
 
                                                           
259 As studied in the Alfa Romeo and Renault examples, by McLaughlin, A. and Maloney, W. (1999). 
260 Very much in line with the definition of “natural selection through competitiveness” described by 
Lopes, Eduardo R. (1999), p2. 
261 As shows Poiares Maduro, Miguel (1997), p61. 
262 As seen in the cases of Ford’s acquisition of Jaguar, Fiat’s acquisition of Alfa Romeo, and others. 
263 The definition of a mature market, and the definition of market cycles can be seen in Cardeal, Nuno 
(2008), p8.  
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6. The state of the art of the automobile industry in Europe 
In the 1980s a cohesive policy network failed to develop in the automobile sector at a 
European level. In fact, the policy sector had a range of governing structures which had 
prevented such an arrangement. First, the industry was still dominated by “national 
champions”. Harmonization involved significant risks for these companies as the delays 
in achieving Whole Vehicle Type Approval illustrated. Second, the industry had a 
tradition of independent political activity264 which came to the front at the regional 
level, frustrating EEC institutions’ efforts to replace national policies with regional 
policies. Third, European collective organizations (like CCLA and CCMC) were long 
established in the automobile sector but they were unreliable partners for EEC officials 
as they pursued integrative steps in the 1980s. 
What existed in the second half of the 1980s was a European policy network which 
lacked the order of a community policy. National cleavages were still strong, there were 
different levels of support for harmonization and Europeanization among national 
policy networks, and the European institutions had not at that stage wrestled significant 
decision-making power from member states. Many automobile companies were still 
dependent on state aid and were focused in achieving competitiveness only within 
Europe.  
There was a decisive change in the late 1980s as the deadline towards further 
integration, embodied in the Single European Act and Single European Market was 
approaching dramatically265. Although, large parts of the automobile industry failed to 
understand the significance of the Single Market program in legislative terms, and 
collectively the sector was left trailing in a rising of draft proposals from a rejuvenated 
Commission, where the weakness of the existing network and divisions within the 
industry provided the opportunity for the Commission to have a more assertive policy 
style. The Commission was able to exercise policy leadership at this stage, even if its 
preference was to work closely within a more cohesive network in policy development. 
Nevertheless, the Commission exploited the issue which surrounded the Single Market 
Program, to expand its influence in the automobile sector. From 1989 onwards, the 
Commission effectively controlled the formulation of policies, the timing of initiatives 
                                                           
264 As Cooper stated”an increasing network of institutions which go beyond of the international 
diplomacy’s traditional rules” in Cooper, Robert (2003); p34. 
265 Grant, W. (1992). 
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and the policy instruments that would translate policy into action. The Commission used 
these powers to good effect as it brokered the Element of Consensus understanding. 
This was just one example of the policy leadership which was demonstrated in its 
efforts to integrate the automobile sector. Another good example was the introduction of 
a sectoral state aids framework266. The period of state direction and imposition was a 
transitory development. In the 1990s there has been increasing evidence of a more 
cohesive network structure emerging at the middle-level. This process began during 
negotiations over the Element of Consensus267. The Commission, having determined the 
parameters of policy, then went to further lengths to negotiate implementation details 
with the industry.  
Another clear indicator of cohesion at European-level networks in the automobile sector 
has come in the area of technical harmonization where policy community structures 
evolved in the 1990s. Back in the 1980s the Commission wanted to introduce a gradual 
program of tighter standards and negotiations were paralyzed by differing corporate and 
national interests, but in the 1990s such disputes reduced considerably. The 
Commission’s achievements in this area would lead one to characterize the governing 
process as “supranational politics”268. Just as European integration initially reinforced 
relationships between “national champions” and member states, similarly the threats 
and opportunities posed by the globalization created pressure for closer cooperation 
between the Commission and automobile producers. Globalization was pushing the 
industry towards even closer joint venture activity, cross-shareholding arrangements 
and increasing consolidation and rationalization. This was changing the industrial 
structure of the sector and would in turn change the inherent governing structures of the 
policy network.  
The majority of the industrial sectors were exposed to varying levels of European 
regulation and policy and we would expect different types of policy networks to exist in 
each of these. However, sometimes these policy networks lacked cohesion269. There 
                                                           
266 Sandholtz, W. and Zysman, J. (1989); p71. 
267 Standarization in the European Economy. Commission Communication. Follow-up to the Commission 
Green Paper of October 1990. COM (91). 
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269 Kassim, H. (1994) p17. 
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were many factors in the multi-level system that could challenge and weaken networks. 
The key studies of internal policy in the automobile sector emphasized a horizontal 
approach to industrial support rather than a sectoral one. It is no coincidence that the 
Commission first established a sectoral state aids framework, then a sectoral framework 
on import tariffs, before finally drafting an action plan on industrial support that 
contained few specific sectoral measures. The message from this process was clear: 
general support was available to all industrial enterprises, and the automobile sector 
would have to win its share on merit. The special treatment, so long a feature at national 
level, was not on offer.  Helping the auto firms to win their share, ACEA had on several 
occasions urged the Commission to pursue a “managed trade” strategy and to learn the 
lessons of the Japanese Ministry of International Trade’s success with industrial policy 
initiatives. Somme scholars were highly critical of the Commission’s laisser-faire 
approach to industrial policy. Although, as Dancet and Rosentock270 highlighted, there 
is a difference between a strategy that is deliberated minimalist and not having a 
strategy at all. They also remember that at the time, member states didn’t give the 
Commission a license to pursue a more interventionist approach. Thus, the CE had an 
industrial policy for automobiles in the analyzed period. Its central pillars were the state 
aids framework, technical harmonization, R&D, over-capacity and the removal of tariff 
barriers to the Single Market. These priorities may not have been shared by all sides, but 
they have been clearly articulated by the Commission in the last decade271. 
National governments were major actors in the Community, who have adapted and 
expanded their capacities alongside Community institutions, where there was a 
symbiosis (and not a tradeoff) between national and Community levels. Also the formal 
institutional structure was supplemented, and often made to work, by an informal 
network of the Community and national police-makers whose influence was decisive in 
many cases.  Many attributes typical of national political systems, such as interest 
groups, patron-client relationships between agencies and those they regulate, 
bureaucratic policies, and even pressure from public opinion, were also developed at the 
Community level272. 
 
                                                           
270 Dancet, G and Rosenstock M. (1995); p47. 
271 Tsoukalis, L. (1997), p92. 
272 Dominik, Lasok et al. (1981), p562. 
Eduardo Gaspar Silva  Universidade Católica Portuguesa 
Master in European Studies – Instituto de Estudos Europeus  Page 93 
Conclusion 
The member states have transferred to the European Commission the competence to 
intervene in national economies under the State Aid framework273, and the competence 
to sanction directly the companies based in member states or in third countries, as long 
as their distort the market in the Common Market274.  The process of European 
integration has provided the context of convergence of national policies into European 
Union policies. The discussion of the EEC-Japan car agreement showed how 
incompatible and distinctive national policies are now being tied up in a common 
framework. Often the process was softened by implementation clauses, derogation and 
so forth, but the trend towards transnational policy is unmistakable and irreversible in 
an industry in the way of globalizing its production.  
There were many directives on the Commission’s agenda which could have significant 
costs implications for the companies concerned. The approach to corporate 
representation taken by each automobile company was influenced by the configuration 
of the national political system, the decision-making environment there and the 
company’s relationship with national authorities. As we saw in the previous chapters, 
Fiat and Renault enjoyed a symbiotic relationship with the Italian and French states. 
These companies represented vital economic interests and relied heavily on their 
national contacts to influence European policy. However, while European integration 
has reinforced national group-state relationships, the frequency and the importance of 
European policy-making have also led to tensions at the national level.  
The entire integration process in Europe was an incremental one, because the 
Commission had to build consensus for EEC-wide policy, and to reassure those interests 
linked to national policy instruments. The 1991 understanding pushed the European 
automobile sector closer to the goal of an integrated and liberalized market. This was 
always the Commission’s intention. Thus, the Commission continually brokered deals 
at the national, regional and international level. It had a seat at each negotiating table, 
something that no other actor in the process possessed.  It used its pivotal position to 
good effect by producing compromises and deals, sometimes through incentives, at 
other times with veiled threats. It was the Commission and not national governments 
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that sponsored the reorganization of the industry, and through the ACEA it was able to 
persuade the industry to modify its position and unite behind a common line.  
The notion of multi-level governance275 seems to capture some of the essence of 
European policy-making in the automobile sector. There were some functional reasons 
why multi-level governance evolved in Europe. The main was that the Commission, as 
a policy drafter, established coalitions and structures with societal interests and public 
authorities across nations, in order to effectively manage the integration process. At 
least, for sectors where integration and harmonization were firmly on the CE policy 
agenda, multi-level governance was an empirical reality.  
The development of European industrial policies and the shift of decision-making 
authority from nation states to Brussels was evident in the automobile industry for some 
time and raised the spectrum of new networks, new actors and governing structures at 
the transnational level. Within such networks we find actors from the national and 
regional level involved in a process of issue resolution. The interaction between national 
actors and transnational actors was as important to policy outcomes as the interactions 
that took place within the national network.  
At one level, the need for a national response to Commission draft directives has had 
the effect of reinforcing relationships between domestic groups and national officials. 
There can be extracted three main causes for this. First, there is a degree of national 
solidarity between governments and industrialists in response to the “outside” 
interventions of CE policy-makers. Second, national governments are responsible for 
assessing the impact of Commission directives at an early stage, which means ensuring 
that they are sensitive to national circumstances. Third, domestic companies realize that 
through the Committee of Permanent Representatives and the Council of Ministers, 
national governments were still powerful in the decision-making process. On some 
issues the Council could have a decisive influence at an advanced stage in policy 
development. However, this was a reactive approach and often meant a failure to exert 
influence at earlier stages in policy development. 
Therefore we have a kind of paradox: the ability of domestic networks to manage their 
policy agenda has been circumscribed by the shifting of decision-making power to the 
European level, yet, this very process has reinforced relationships within domestic 
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networks because of the amount of policy scrutiny required. Another important feature 
is that the European integration process challenged the legal monopoly of States and the 
hierarchical organization of the law276.  
It is hoped that this thesis can be a credible study of the European automobile industry, 
and that has provided the right basis in order to other scholars continue the analysis, the 
studies and the investigations in the European studies. 
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Acronyms 
 
ACEA - Association des Constructeurs Européens d’Automobiles  
BMC - British Motor Corporation (British car Manufacturer) 
BMW - Bayerische Motoren Werke (German car Manufacturer) 
BRITE - Basic Research in Industrial Technologies in Europe 
CCMC - Committee of Common Market Automobile Constructors 
CGT - Confédération générale du travail 
CLCA - Liaison Committee of the Automobile Industry of the Countries of European 
Communities  
DAF - Van Doorne's Aanhangwagen Fabriek (Dutch truck Manufacturer) 
DKW - Dampf-Kraft-Wagen (German car Manufacturer) 
EC – European Commission 
ECU – European Currency Unit 
EEC – European Economic Community 
ESPRIT - European Strategic Program on Research in Information Technology 
EU – European Union 
EUCAR - European Council for Automotive Research and Development 
EURAM - European Research in Advanced Materials 
FIAT - Fabbrica Italiana di Automobili di Torino (Italian car Manufacturer) 
G&R - Gnôme and Rhône (French car Manufacturer) 
GATT - General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
GM – General Motors (American car Manufacturer) 
JAMA - Japanese Automobile Manufacturer Association 
MAN - Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nürnberg (German truck and bus Manufacturer) 
NSU – Neckarsulm (German car Manufacturer) 
OICA - Organization of International Automobile Constructors 
R&D – Research and Development 
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SEAT - Sociedad Española de Automóviles de Turismo (Spanish car Manufacturer) 
SEM – Single European Market 
SMMT - Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders  
U.S. – United States of America 
VER - Voluntary Export Restraint 
WVTA - Whole Vehicle Type Approval  
 
 
